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ABSTRACT
PARADOXICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PROHIBITIONS
SEPTEMBER 2010
SANA SHEIKH, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
Traditionally, attribution theory argues that strong external controls such as parental
punishment undermine moral internalization. In contrast, this project argues that parental
punishment does socialize morality, but it socializes moral prohibitions (rather than moral
prescriptions) in particular. A strong focus on prohibitions, a proscriptive orientation,
has unintended consequences. Study 1 found young adults’ accounts of parental
restrictiveness to predict their proscriptive orientation such that recalling the degree of
how restrictive and punitive one’s parents were activated a proscriptive dispositional
sensitivity. Study 2 found that restrictive parenting was positively associated with shame.
Further, for individuals with highly restrictive parents, temptations positively were
related to shame. Due to the shame associated with temptations for individuals with
restrictive parents, mental suppression was more difficult for them. After experimentally
priming a proscriptive (versus prescriptive) orientations and inducing mental suppression
of “immoral” thoughts, Study 3 found an interaction between proscriptive prime and
parental restrictiveness such that the proscriptive prime caused the greatest amount of ego
depletion, a loss of self-regulatory resources for those with restrictive parents. In the end,
individuals who were most focused on prohibitions and had restrictive parents felt the
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most shame and had the lowest self-regulatory ability to resist their “immoral”
temptations.

vi

CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................v
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………….....x
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... xi
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................1
Socialization of Proscriptive versus Prescriptive Orientation ...........................2
Restrictive Parenting and Internalization of a Proscriptive Orientation ............5
Prohibitions Incur Temptation and Shame ........................................................8
Confirmation Bias and Feature Positive Monitoring .............................8
Consequence 1: A Proneness to Shame, but Not Guilt....................................11
Consequence 2: An Increased Feeling of Temptation .....................................14
Consequence 3: A Greater Likelihood to Engage in “Immorality” .................15
Mental Suppression of “Immoral” Thoughts ...................................................16
Ego Depletion as a Result of Mental Suppression ...........................................17
Implications of Project ……………………………………………………….19

II.

STUDY 1: RESTRICTIVE PARENTING SOCIALIZES A FOCUS ON
PROHIBITIONS ..............................................................................................22
Method .............................................................................................................22
Participants ...........................................................................................22
Materials ..............................................................................................22

Child Rearing Practices Report…………………....................22
Moralisms Scale…………… ...................................................23

Procedure .............................................................................................25
Results and Discussion ....................................................................................25

vii

III.

STUDY 2: TEMPTATION AND SHAME ARISE FROM RESTRICTIVE
PARENTING ...................................................................................................29
Method .............................................................................................................31
Participants ...........................................................................................31
Materials ..............................................................................................31

CRPR………………… ...........................................................31
Temptation Scales…………… ................................................31
Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3R……………........................32
Procedure .............................................................................................33
Results and Discussion ................................................................................................33
IV.

STUDY 3: THE EGO DEPLETING EFFECTS OF
PROHIBITIONS…………………………………..…………………………40
Method .............................................................................................................41
Participants ...........................................................................................41
Materials ..............................................................................................41

CRPR………………… ...........................................................41
Moral Priming Manipulation…………… ...............................42
Pictures with mental suppression induction…………….........42
Stroop Task…………… ..........................................................42
Procedure .............................................................................................42
Results and Discussion ................................................................................................42

V.

GENERAL DISCUSSION ..............................................................................46

Limitations and Future Research .....................................................................51
Implications of Project .....................................................................................54
ENDNOTES………………………………………………………………………….57
APPENDICES

viii

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

MODIFIED VERSION OF THE CHILD REARING
PRACTICES REPORT....................................................................................68
THE MORALISMS SCALE ...........................................................................73
PROJECTIVE AND PERSONAL TEMPTATION MEASURES ..................78
TEST OF SELF-CONSCIOUS AFFECT-3R ..................................................83
PROSCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE ORIENTATION PRIMES ............90
MENTAL SUPPRESION STIMULI..…………………………………….....92
STROOP TASK EXAMPLES .........................................................................93

REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………….94

ix

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Proscriptive and Prescriptive
Orientations………………………..............................................................................57
2. Correlations with Parenting Scale, Projective Measures, and Moral
Emotions ………….....................................................................................................58
3. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Ego
Depletion……………………………………………………………………………..59

x

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 1)…………………….......60
2. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 2).......................................61
3. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 2).………………………..62
4. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 3)...………………………63
5. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Proscriptive Moral Orientation as a Function of
Accounts of Parental Restrictiveness and Order of Manipulation....………………...64
6. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Shame-Proneness as a Function of Accounts of
Parental Restrictiveness and Projective Temptation…………………………………65
7. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Stroop Interference as a Function of Accounts of
Parental Restrictiveness and Moral Priming Conditions…………………………….66

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, psychologists have explained immoral conduct as a failure to
internalize the appropriate moral norm. Social psychological theory on attribution argues
that strong external controls such as parental punishment undermine moral internalization
(see review by Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; also see Lepper, 1983). Here, moral demands
made with threat of punishment produce compliance on the child’s part; however, the
child does not attribute such compliance to a personal desire or internal motivation, but
rather to external pressure. From this attributional perspective, children who refrain from
acting out because their parents will punish them are being regulated by external controls,
and thus are more likely to act out when the threat of punishment is absent. Studies show
that punitive parenting is related to adolescents’ failures to restrain from “antisocial”
behaviors (e.g., Baumrind, 1991; Paulussen-Hoogeboom et al., 2007). Yet such
parenting is also associated with high levels of distress and shame (e.g., Tangney &
Dearing, 2002). Thus distress and shame indicate that children of punitive parents are
evaluating themselves against some internalized norms, and given that shame is a strong
moral emotion, these norms are likely to be moral.
To further understand the effects of punishment on an individual’s moral
experience, I will trace one route whereby morally socialized and motivated individuals
nevertheless feel a greater degree of temptation to engage in what they themselves view
as immoral conduct. Specifically, I argue that there are two routes to moral socialization.
Punitive parenting socializes a focus on prohibitions: If a child engages in bad behavior
and is subsequently punished, the message transmitted is that to be a moral person, one
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should inhibit bad (punishable) behaviors. Warmth and positive parenting socializes the
activation of good behaviors: If a child helps another and is rewarded with praise, the
message transmitted is that to be a moral person, one should activate good (praiseworthy)
behaviors, such as those that reflect prosociality. I argue that the moral socialization of
prohibitions can paradoxically create an increased desire to engage in immoral conduct.
Using theory based in social cognition, I claim that this process is automatic, largely
unconscious, and does not require “antisocial” or “delinquent” tendencies as traditionally
assumed.
Further, although both guilt and shame are emotions felt as negative moral selfevaluations, I argue that shame (but not guilt) increases as a result of feeling tempted to
do the wrong thing. Given that shame in particular impinges on a person’s psychological
well-being and is related to poor interpersonal functioning, this consequence has
detrimental implications for the proscriptively-oriented individual.
Socialization of Proscriptive versus Prescriptive Orientations
The study of morality in psychology has largely taken place in the moral
developmental literature, within the cognitive-developmental (Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg,
1981, 1984), socialization (Kochanska, 1993; Kochanska, Coy, and Murray, 2001;
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) and psychoanalytic traditions (Freud, 1960/1923; Klein, 1933;
Sears, Whiting, Nowlis, & Sears, 1953; Sullivan, 1953). Although Piaget (1965) and
Kohlberg (1981, 1984) provided the impetus for the psychological study of moral
reasoning, cognitive-developmentalists in general have not typically considered
motivation as part of their theorizing on moral development. Conversely, socialization
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researchers view moral development as guided largely by affective and motivational
processes.
Moral socialization is the process whereby an individual internalizes norms of
right and wrong from relational experiences with others. The parental-figure, or “the
carrier of culture” (Sullivan, 1953, p.35), is the first vehicle through which transmission
of standards of conduct occurs. Parent-child interactions not only influence which
standards the child will internalize, but also the nature of the child’s self-regulatory and
self-evaluative capabilities (Kagan, 1984). Here, self-regulation refers to the ability of an
individual to guide her actions in accordance with internalized norms, and self-evaluation
refers to the ability of the child to evaluate herself as good or bad against an internalized
norm.
The moral socialization process begins around the age of two, when the child
starts to “make inferences about symbolic meanings” (Kagan and Lamb, 1987, p. 10;
Piaget, 1951; Case, 1985; Werner & Kaplan, 1963). Kagan and Lamb (1987) provide an
example in which a child experiences distress after failing at a self-imposed task, building
a toy tower. The distress alludes to some recognition of the discrepancy between the
child’s own performance at building the toy tower and the representation of a more
perfect one. This representation of the perfect toy tower functions as the evaluative
standard that guides behavior towards achieving that particular standard. The
socialization of moral standards of conduct is analogous: through relations with others,
especially parental figures, the child internalizes moral standards from which she then
regulates her behavior and evaluates herself accordingly.
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I propose that the socialization processes differ for engaging in a desirable activity
(“shoulds”) versus restraining from prohibited behaviors (“should nots”). Along with
Janoff-Bulman, I have proposed a theoretical account of and provided experimental
evidence for different self-regulatory underpinnings of these two forms of moral
behaviors (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Self-regulation theory posits two
motivations that guide behaviors in relation to internal end-states: one is focused on
approaching a positive or rewarding end-state and the other on avoiding a negative or
punishing end-state.
Prohibitions, for instance “I should not harm others,” require the inhibition of
punishable behaviors and entail the motivation to avoid punishing end-states, or “antigoals” (e.g., Carver, 2006)—what we call a proscriptive orientation. Conversely, positive
obligations, such as “I should help others,” require the activation of praiseworthy
behavior and entail the motivation to approach rewarding end-states—what we call a
prescriptive orientation (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Thus, a proscriptive orientation
engages negative internal referents (e.g., “I should not harm others”) and a prescriptive
orientation engages positive internal referents (e.g., “I should help others”). The
proscriptive system regulates morality by curbing negative desires and temptations to
engage in wrong conduct. In contrast, the prescriptive system regulates morality by
catalyzing the positive desire to engage in right conduct. Although we all have both selfregulatory systems to some extent, one may be dominant over the other, both may be
equally dominant, or neither may be dominant (indicating the failure of moral
socialization).
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Additionally, researchers have demonstrated a phenomenon called the negativity
bias, whereby the motivation to avoid a negative entity is stronger than that to approach a
positive entity, and failure of the former incurs greater psychological distress than failure
of the latter (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman,
2001). Relating the negativity bias to moral experience, Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009)
provide support for the greater potency of the proscriptive system over the prescriptive
system. More specifically, moral judgments related to the proscriptive system are more
condemnatory, strict, and mandatory than those related to the prescriptive system, and
proscriptive immorality engenders greater blame than prescriptive immorality. It is not
surprising that, for example, “not harming others” is more mandatory then “helping
others”—and that commission of bad behavior is more mandatory and incurs less blame
than the omission of good behavior.
Kochanska and colleagues’ studies on children’s moral development (Aksan &
Kochanska, 2005; Kochanska, 2002; Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2001) provide support
for differentiating between these two forms of moral self-regulation. They distinguished
between “do’s,” behaviors involving activating and sustaining an activity (e.g., cleaning
up one’s toys), and “don’ts,” involving prohibitions and suppressing behaviors (e.g., not
playing with an attractive, yet forbidden toy). Kochanska et al.’s (2001) research
demonstrates that “do’s” are more challenging than “don’ts” for children at all ages
studied (i.e., 14, 22, 33, and 45 months), and fearfulness is associated with “don’ts,” but
not with “do’s.” The researchers conclude that their data provide “impressive evidence
of substantial differences” between do’s and don’ts in early self-regulation.
Restrictive Parenting and Internalization of a Proscriptive Orientation
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What types of relational experiences socialize a proscriptive orientation? Two
parenting dimensions central to socialization research are parental restrictiveness and
nurturance (e.g., Baumrind, 1966; 1967). Parental restrictiveness refers to the amount of
parental monitoring and the rigidity of limits set for the child, mainly exhibited by the
threat or use of punishment and psychological and/or physical control, whereas
nurturance refers to the amount of affective warmth expressed by the parents in parentchild interactions.
In her influential research, developmental psychologist Diana Baumrind crossed
these two dimensions to distinguish among authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive
parenting styles (and later added neglectful; see e.g., Maccoby & Martin, 1983). Here,
the authoritative parent combines nurturance with restrictiveness (i.e., high nurturancehigh restrictiveness), guiding the child’s behavior through issue-oriented rationales and
encourages verbal give and take from the child. The permissive parent makes few
demands and is generally accepting of the child’s desires and actions (i.e, high nurtuancelow restrictiveness). The authoritarian parent is highly restrictive and displays little to no
warmth towards the child (i.e., high restrictiveness-low nurturance); s/he utilizes punitive
force, a focus on threats, and obedience to the parental figures. As noted by Baumrind
(1966, p.890), “The authoritarian parent attempts to shape, control, and evaluate the
behavior and attitudes of the child in accordance with a set standard of conduct…She
values obedience as a virtue and favors punitive, forceful measures to curb self-will at
points where the child's actions or beliefs conflict with what she thinks is right conduct.”
Baumrind (1966, p. 892) states that severe punishment and control have harmful
side-effects and can be an “ineffective means of controlling child behavior…” Baumrind
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(1991) found that adolescents from authoritarian homes manifested somewhat more
“problem behavior” and substance use than children from authoritative homes; they were
also significantly less prosocial than children from authoritative homes. PaulussenHoogeboom, Stams, Hermanns, & Peetsma’s (2007) meta-analytic paper on the effects of
punishment and authoritarian parenting on children and adolescent behavior found that
children with punitive, or “negative control” parenting exhibit lower obedience and
conformity with standards of adults, compared with children with “positive control”
parenting styles. Lamborn, Steinberg, and colleagues (Lamborn, Mounts, Steinberg, &
Dorbbusch, 1991; Steinberg, Mounts, Lamborn, & Dorbbusch, 1991) observed that
children with authoritarian parents exhibited higher psychological distress (measured by
measures of anxiety, tension, and depression) and lower self-perceptions of social and
academic abilities. Tangney and Dearing (2002) also report that adolescents of punitive
parents, who use putdowns and are emotionally abusive, have high levels of shame.
Overall, the authoritarian parent’s focus on punishment aims to socialize prohibitions and
promote obedience, but research evidence suggests that it is not always effective and
instead produces detrimental psychological consequences.
The importance of restrictive, punitive parenting on behavior is the meaning
accorded to these parental practices and their interpretations by the child (Baumrind,
1996). From recurring punishment or threat of punishment, I propose that the parent is
communicating to the child that she or he is a person inclined to be immoral and engage
in immoral conduct, this being the reason for the parent’s restrictive, punitive orientation.
Parental control and punishment focuses the child on the bad behaviors she or he needs to
restrain from (“should nots”), but not on encouraging her to activate socially valuable
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behaviors (“shoulds”). The parent restricts the child’s behavior—and this is exactly the
moral function of proscriptions--that is, restricting immoral behavior. Overall, restrictive,
punitive parenting does morally socialize, but through the regulation of actions motivated
to avoid punishment and the evaluation of morality based on how well one successfully
inhibits immoral conduct—here, the child of the restrictive parent is proscriptivelyoriented.
Using young adults’ retrospective accounts of their parent-child interactions,
Study 1 tests the predictive value of parental restrictiveness (but not parental nurturance)
on a proscriptive, but not prescriptive orientation (see Figure 1). The child of the
restrictive, punitive parent has internalized morality—a proscriptive morality.
Prohibitions Incur Temptation and Shame
A parent-child relationship that involves restrictive, punishing experiences tells a
child that s/he needs to attend to and be vigilant in curbing bad, immoral (punishable)
conduct. This proscriptive orientation is a precursor to actually wanting to engage in
immoral conduct. In this case, the desire to engage in immoral conduct is not a result of
anti-social motivation or reactance against external constraints (e.g., Brehm, 1966).
Instead, the proscriptively-oriented person is motivated to avoid engaging in immoral
conduct, believing the prohibited conduct is wrong, should be inhibited, and if
transgressed, implicates the self as immoral. Yet, paradoxically, the desire to engage in
these behaviors may increase.
Below I review psychological research that has shown that processes outside
awareness or control can affect conscious experiences, self-evaluation, and behaviors.
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These social cognitive processes can affect moral experience and can engender an
increase in temptation, shame, and even immoral behavior.
Confirmation Bias and Feature Positive Monitoring
People’s motivations can affect the conclusions they arrive at when processing
information. This phenomenon is known as the confirmation bias, which involves “the
seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs,
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” (Nickerson, 1998, p. 175). In other words, people
tend to be biased when processing information even when their conscious intentions are
to consider information without biases. A study by Lord, Ross, & Lepper (1979) on
attitude polarization illustrates the confirmation bias: here, participants with conflicting
positions presented with the same evidence found reasons to confirm and strengthen their
views. Also showing the confirmation bias, Beck (1976) has noted that depressed
patients selectively attend to information that supports reasons for their depression, but
not to information that may alleviate their depression.
The confirmation bias may actually reflect a more general cognitive process that
entails feature positive monitoring (Klayman & Ha, 1987). Feature positive monitoring
is the likelihood of focusing on the presence of evidence rather than its absence. For
example, people find it easier to comprehend a statement asserting that something is
present over a statement asserting that something is absent (Clark, 1974). People also
tend to notice when two events co-occur more then when they do not co-occur, and to
overestimate the correlation of how much the two events co-occur (illusory correlation;
see e.g., Chapman and Chapman, 1967). From a feature positive monitoring perspective,
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depressed patients may exhibit the confirmation bias as a result of attending to the
presence of reasons to maintain their depression rather than the absence of those reasons.
Motivation also affects the manner in which people attend to and interpret
instances rather than absences. Psychologists have shown that people who are motivated
to either approach a desired goal or avoid an undesired goal monitor their own thoughts
and behaviors, often unconsciously, in order to gauge how successful they are in
approaching desired goals or avoiding undesired goals (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1982;
1991). In the case of approaching desired goals, individuals will presumably monitor for
the presence of desired outcomes, whereas in the case of avoiding undesired goals,
individuals will presumably monitor for the presence of undesired outcomes. The former
happen to be successes, instances where the goal is successfully approached; the latter are
failures, instances where the goal in unsuccessfully avoided. Thus Coats, Janoff-Bulman,
and Alpert (1996) found that avoidance motivation led participants to focus on failures
and resulted in lower self-esteem, lower optimism, and more depression compared to
those in the approach motivation condition of the study, who focused instead on
successes. Following the confirmation bias and feature positive searches, approach
motivation makes accessible constructs representing successes in approaching desired
goals while avoidance motivation makes accessible constructs representing failures to
avoid the undesired goals.
Similarly, people’s moral motivations can affect the conclusions they arrive at. I
propose that morally motivated individuals also monitor their thoughts and behavior—
and differently, depending on whether they are proscriptively or prescriptively oriented.
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Given that a proscriptive orientation focuses on inhibiting prohibited behaviors, featurepositive searches would monitor for failures—thoughts and behaviors of prohibited
conduct (the “should nots”). A prescriptive orientation focuses on activating good
behaviors, and thus feature-positive searches would monitor for successes—thoughts and
behaviors of good deeds (the “shoulds”). And following the confirmation bias, believing
one is capable of and likely to act immorally will bring to consciousness instances of
one’s own immorality. Moreover, compared to a prescriptive orientation, a proscriptive
orientation will bring to consciousness thoughts of prohibited behaviors. In contrast, a
prescriptive orientation, entailing a motivation to activate good behaviors, the “shoulds,”
would bring to consciousness instances of good behaviors, but not the absence of those
thoughts.
The point here is that if restrictive parenting socializes a proscriptive orientation,
individuals with restrictive parents are more likely to attend to thoughts involving
immorality and proscribed behaviors than those who are not proscriptively-oriented.
There are three likely consequences: (1) Individuals with restrictive parents are more
likely to evaluate themselves by focusing on immoral failures and are thus are more
prone to shame; (2) Individuals with restrictive parents are more aware of their current,
“immoral” temptations, which are also distressing and shame-inducing; (3) Through
mental suppression and ego depletion processes, this greater awareness of temptations
and its association with shame leads to an increased inclination to engage in the immoral
conduct.
Consequence 1: A Proneness to Shame, but not Guilt
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Thoughts of proscriptive immorality are likely to result in negative moral selfevaluative consequences, especially those associated with feelings of shame. Because the
person is proscriptively-oriented, the evaluation may be similar to those transmitted by
parental figures through punitive measures: “You are an immoral person, capable of and
inclined to engage in immoral behavior.”
Shame, in addition to guilt, is a self-evaluative emotion that serves as an indicator
of one’s moral failure. Although the two emotions are oftentimes colloquially
interchangeable, psychologists have distinguished shame and guilt as
phenomenologically different and have related each to very different outcomes (Lewis,
1971). Shame and guilt induce different behaviors: in particular, guilt has been found to
motivate reparative actions such as apologizing, confessing, and righting the wrong.
Shame, however, does not motivate these actions; instead, individuals experiencing
shame are more likely to want to deny their actions, hide from others, and escape from
the situation. In a detailed interview study of individuals’ guilt and shame experiences,
Lindsay-Hartz (1984) observed that interviewees were eager to describe their experiences
of guilt, but hesitant to talk about shame. The author elaborates on the willingness of
interviewees to talk about their experiences of guilt as reflecting “an urge to confess and
talk about their experiences of guilt and to try to make up for what had happened. When
recounting experiences of guilt, they wanted to confess and atone…[a] manifestation of a
more general desire—the desire to set things right.” In contrast, interviewees’ caution in
discussing the topic of shame reflected an “urgency to hide these shameful experiences
from others, as well as from themselves...if one does not ask, one does not find out about
such experiences.” Although still a negative state, guilt allows for moral redemption.
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Shame, on the other hand, allows for no such phenomenal possibility, which may be why
shame has been considered detrimental to interpersonal and intrapsychic functioning (e.g.,
Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
Why would restrictive parenting lead to shame rather than guilt? In my previous
work with Janoff-Bulman (e.g., Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), I have provided a moral
regulatory framework for self-evaluation emotions. Here, shame and guilt appear to have
different self-regulatory underpinnings that reflect the proscriptive-prescriptive
distinction. In past research we have found that avoidance orientation is positively
associated with shame-proneness, and that situationally priming a proscriptive orientation
results in increased feelings of shame (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). (Guilt, on the
other hand, is not associated with a proscriptive orientation, but with a prescriptive
orientation.) In other words, shame involves the interpretation that one has failed to
inhibit wrong, punishable conduct; one acted like a cheat, a thief, or a liar. Guilt,
however, reflects the failure to approach a positive, rewarding referent; one did not act
like a caring friend, an honest person, or a loving partner (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman,
2010). The two different interpretations result in different action tendencies, hiding (to
avoid and inhibit one’s immorality) versus mending (to approach and restore one’s
morality). And consistent with the negativity bias in self-regulation, if shame is
avoidance-based while guilt is approach-based, it is not surprising that shame is
considerably more painful than guilt (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney,
Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992).
Understanding shame as resulting from a failure to inhibit bad behavior is
supported by consistent findings of some transgressions as more likely to engender shame
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than others. Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) have argued that cultural practices of sexual
objectification increase in particular women’s self-objectification, resulting in “body
shame,” and eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and bulimia have also been
positively associated with shame (e.g., Calogero, Davis, & Thompson, 2005; Sanftner,
Barlow, Marschall, & Tangney, 1995; see also, Nussbaum, 2005). Alcohol and/or drug
abuse has been found to be positively correlated with shame, while negatively or
negligibly correlated with guilt (Dearing, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Kurtz, 2007).
Tavares, Martins, Zilberman, & el-Guabaly (2002) provide evidence for high shame
among gamblers seeking clinical treatment. These behaviors are “excesses” or
“indulgences” that reflect proscriptive morality and the failure of inhibition or selfcontrol, and thus incur shame.
Similar to Coats et al.’s (1996) finding that an avoidance motivation’s focus on
failures resulted in lower self-esteem, lower optimism, and more depression compared to
an approach motivation, those who have had restrictive, punitive parents (and are
proscriptively-oriented) are likely to focus on immoral failures, resulting in feelings of
shame, compared to those with a prescriptive orientation. Overall, recurrent restrictive
and punitive parenting is then likely to instill a proneness to shame (rather than guilt).
Study 2 tests the positive relationship between parental restrictiveness and shameproneness in particular (Figure 2).
Consequence 2: An Increased Feeling of Temptation
A feature positive monitoring process not only makes past immorality more
accessible but also present and potentially future instances of immorality, particularly
desires or thoughts of actually engaging in the prohibited conduct--in other words,
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temptations. Restrictive, punitive parents then increase awareness of immoral
temptations, which come to consciousness not only as a strategy to know exactly what to
avoid, but as a consequence of a self-regulatory system monitoring for prohibitions.
Attribution researchers have found that people rely on the presence of thoughts
and behaviors to interpret their motivations (e.g., Nisbett & Valins, 1987). Additionally,
researchers have noted that cognitive outcomes of the feature-positive process may be
interpreted as a motivation that requires satisfaction (Forster & Lieberman, 2001;
Lieberman & Forster, 2000). These inferences of motivation are not necessarily explicit,
but may occur outside the realm of consciousness (Forster & Liberman, 2001; see also,
Strack & Forster, 1998). Similarly, the presence of immoral thoughts and desires is
likely to be damning for one’s morality. The subsequent inference may be “I must be a
cheater because I keep thinking about cheating!”—thoughts of immoral temptations
arising in consciousness are used to evaluate one’s entire self as immoral.
Having thoughts and desires to engage in prohibited conduct is likely then to be
another avenue through which the proscriptively-oriented person feels shame, even in the
absence of actually performing a transgression. Thoughts of wanting to engage in
prohibited behavior (i.e., temptations) are interpreted as meaning that one is prone to
immorality—to being a cheat, a thief, a liar. These appraisals increase negative selfevaluative experiences, and shame in particular, without necessitating a mirroring
increase in immoral conduct. And because shame is related to detrimental psychological
consequences, the moral socialization of prohibitions may in fact promote harmful
experiences for the individual. The relationship between a proscriptive orientation,
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temptations, and shame is also tested in Study 2 such that part of the association between
parental restrictiveness and shame is due to the degree of temptations felt (Figure 3).
Consequence 3: A Greater Likelihood to Engage in “Immorality”
A paradoxical consequence of a proscriptive orientation is the increased
likelihood to engage in the prohibited conduct. The accessible immoral thoughts and
temptations are likely to be distressing (as discussed above). If one has distressing or
unwanted thoughts, a likely tactic to evade these thoughts is to try to suppress them. If I
have thoughts about cheating on my partner—thoughts I find distressing —I will likely
try to suppress these thoughts. Yet, the greater awareness of temptations (due to feature
positive monitoring) and their damning implications for the self (due to their relation to
shame) are likely to make suppression difficult. On the other hand, someone who is not
proscriptively-oriented is less likely to be aware of his or her temptations and less likely
to be distressed by these temptations. Mental suppression of immoral temptations is
paradoxically more difficult for the proscriptively-oriented individual, resulting in the
subsequent depletion of psychic resources—and increasing the likelihood of actually
doing the wrong thing.
Mental Suppression of “Immoral” Thoughts
Immoral thoughts and temptations are shame-inducing and likely to be suppressed
as a tactic to inhibit those behaviors. Not only would the greater degree and negative
potency of these temptations make it more difficult to mentally suppress them, but they
would also lead to rebound effects associated with mental suppression more generally.
Of relevance is research on mental suppression that has shown the paradoxical effects of
unwanted thoughts. Specifically, when individuals are asked not to think of a construct,
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they are more likely to think of it than in the absence of the request. Wegner, Schneider,
Carter, & White (1987) most famously illustrated this paradoxical phenomenon by asking
participants not to think of a white bear and found that those who were instructed not to
think of a white bear found it more difficult to suppress white bear thoughts and also had
more white bear thoughts arise in consciousness than those who were not given any
suppression instructions.
Calling the process “expression after suppression,” Liberman and Forster (2000;
see also Forster and Liberman 2001) argue that the difficulty of suppression is due to a
need that arises to “express” the suppressed construct. This is similar to past need-based
theories. Lewin (1951) has also argued that needs “create a state of tension, which is
released when the needs are satisfied” (Liberman and Forster, 2000, pp. 191). Similarly,
memory studies testing the Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1938) found that recall memory
for a task that was interrupted before completion was higher compared with the recall
memory for a task that was completed. Here, the interrupted task inhibited expression,
making need-related constructs still accessible until the need is satisfied.
What does it mean to “express” a construct? For Liberman and Forster (2000,
Forster and Liberman, 2001), expression of a suppressed construct involved using the
suppressed construct in various written and verbal tasks that gave participants the chance
to use the construct. For instance, one of their studies found that asking participants to
suppress the use of color words when describing a Kandinsky painting increased use of
color words in a subsequent unrelated task, compared to participants who were not given
any suppression instructions.
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Not only is suppression of prohibited, shame-inducing temptations more difficult
for the proscriptively-oriented individual, but engaging in suppression is also likely to
ironically increase those very temptations as well as their related negative selfevaluations. Mental suppression is not only harder, but is not likely to be met with
success: shame-inducing temptations are apt to rebound and make an even stronger
presence in one’s consciousness.
Ego Depletion as a Result of Mental Suppression
Suppressing immoral thoughts and temptation that arise in one’s consciousness
that are used to infer one’s own immorality engages self-regulatory capabilities—the
ability to guide one’s thoughts emotions, and actions. Psychologists Baumeister and
colleagues (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, &
Tice, 2007) have argued that engaging in self-regulation expends the self’s, or the ego’s,
psychic energy and reduces future self-regulation. The researchers call this phenomenon
ego depletion and show that mental suppression entails self-regulation, engaging in which
weakens future self-regulatory abilities. In particular, Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister
(1998) found ego-depleting effects in the suppression of mental constructs: participants
who were asked to suppress thoughts of a white bear (Wegner et al., 1987) subsequently
gave up on solving a set of problem-solving tasks faster than those who were not given
any suppression instructions. This study illustrates the self-regulation of unwanted
thoughts as expending the ego’s psychic energy. Since suppressing immoral thoughts
and temptations engages self-regulatory resources, these processes too may also be ego
depleting. Study 3 experimentally tests whether mental suppression of immoral
temptations is most difficult for proscriptively-oriented individuals (compared to
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prescriptively-oriented individuals) given their greater awareness and greater negative
potency of those temptations (Figure 4). Although the rebound loop incurred by
suppression is not directly tested in this project, past research on the paradoxical effects
of mental control overwhelmingly suggests that mental suppression of immoral
temptations will lead to even greater feelings of temptation and even greater failures at
suppression.
Does suppressing prohibited desires lead to ego depletion? If so, behavior is
implicated: If thoughts of immoral conduct are ego depleting, the self may not have the
resources to restrain from desired conduct—meaning that one may be more likely to
actually engage in the proscribed conduct. For example, past research has found that
participants who were ego depleted were more likely to aggress in response to an insult
(DeWall, Baumeister, Stillwell, & Gaillot 2007); that is, restraining aggression also
involves self-regulation. Over time, continuous restraint from temptation is likely to
result in failures to curb those tempting behaviors due to decreased self-regulatory
resources. The effort involved in suppressing “immoral” temptations may actually result
in engaging in those “immoral” actions.
Implications of Project
Morally socialized individuals are generally presumed to be able to restrain from
immoral behaviors, while those who engage in immoral conduct are assumed to hold
“antisocial” or “delinquent” tendencies. From a motivational perspective, however,
temptations may in fact arise from moral socialization. Here, punitive parenting
socializes a focus on restraining from immoral behaviors--or a proscriptive orientation;
and a proscriptive orientation leads to an increased likelihood to experience shame and a
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greater awareness of one’s temptations, incurring even more shame (“I must be a bad
person because I have these temptations”). Suppressing these painful thoughts and
temptations is paradoxically harder for a proscriptively-oriented individual, leading to
rebound effects involving even more immoral temptations, and ultimately resulting in a
greater likelihood of actually engaging in that behavior due to depletion of self-control
resources.
This project highlights the importance of the family structure and the effect of
relational interactions on an adult’s moral experience. The argument interrogates the
traditional psychological view that punishment reinforces the “forbidden fruit,” the
notion that individuals desire what is prohibited as reactance against moral authority. If,
however, feeling tempted also arises automatically and without any previous “antisocial”
tendencies, there are important implications for moral psychology. Socialization agents
may be promoting the very experiences that they are trying to inhibit. Lastly,
understanding shame as resulting from a proscriptive orientation is important because
researchers have related this self-evaluative emotion to poor interpersonal and
psychological well-being.
The relationships discussed above among restrictive parenting, proscriptive
orientation, shame, and ego depletion are represented in the proposed model (Figures 1, 2,
and 3). Three studies were conducted to test aspects of this model. In particular, Study
1 addressed the relationship between restrictive parenting and proscriptive orientation
(Figure 1). Study 2 investigated whether individuals with restrictive parents are more
likely to feel shame and temptation to engage in proscribed conduct (Figures 2 and 3).
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Study 3 looked at the causal effect of manipulating a proscriptive orientation on ego
depletion (Figure 4).
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CHAPTER II
STUDY 1: RESTRICTIVE PARENTING SOCIALIZES A FOCUS ON
PROHIBITIONS
Study 1 investigated the relationship between accounts of restrictive parenting
style and strength of individuals’ proscriptive orientation. I predicted that more
restrictive parenting is positively associated with a stronger proscriptive orientation.
Following the self-regulatory differences between proscriptive and prescriptive
orientation, there should not be an association between restrictive parenting and
prescriptive orientation. Because a proscriptive orientation arises from the meanings
accorded to parental restrictiveness by the child, whereby the “child’s perception of his
parents’ behavior may be more relevant to his adjustment than the actual parental
behavior” (Schludermann and Schludermann, 1970, p. 239), I used a self-report measure
assessing adults’ perceptions of past interactions with their parents—and in particular,
their parents’ restrictiveness and nurturance. The following hypothesis was tested in
study 1: There is a positive, unique relationship between adults’ retrospective accounts of
their parents’ behaviors and internalization of prohibitions but not positive obligations.
Method
Participants
A total of 280 participants (218 women and 62 men) completed the study. In this
sample, 196 participants identified themselves as White, 42 as Asian, 14 as Latino/a, and
12 as Black.
Materials
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Child Rearing Practices Report (CRPR): A modified version of the CRPR (Rickel
& Biasatti, 1982), a 40-item self-report scale measuring participants’ retrospective
accounts of their parents’ restrictive and nurturing behaviors, was administered (see
Appendix A). The prompt asked participants, “Using the scale below, indicate how
closely it describes your relationship with your mother (or father) figure.” Each item was
asked for a mother figure and a father figure separately (and presentation was
counterbalanced). Parental restrictiveness, measured with 22 items, and parental
nurturance, measured with 18 items, were given in randomized order. Restrictiveness
items entailed statements assessing parental punitiveness, uses of threats, and
physical/psychological control. Such statements included, “Used to control me by
warning me of all the bad things that could happen to me” and “Thought that scolding
and criticism would make me improve.” Nurturance items included, “Expressed affection
by hugging, kissing, and holding me” and “Emphasized praising me when I was good
more than punishing me when I was bad.” The scale also asked participants to indicate
whether their mother figure and father figure were biological, adoptive, stepmother/father,
or other. The scale has been used to assess Baumrind’s four parenting styles using a
median split (Reitman & Gross, 1997). For the analyses in this research, scores on
restrictiveness and nurturance were analysed as continuous variables.
Moralisms Scale. A 20-item measure was developed by Janoff-Bulman et al.
(2009) to assess proscriptive and prescriptive moral judgments (see Appendix B). The
scale comprises 10 proscriptive and 10 prescriptive items. Each item consists of a
scenario in which the target person is deciding whether or not to engage in a particular
behavior. In the case of proscriptive items, these are behaviors the person presumably
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should not engage in to be considered moral. Proscriptive scenarios represented
behaviors involving personal temptations or behaviors that indicate a desire or
willingness to disregard social norms. Examples included “excessive” gambling, wearing
a skimpy dress to a funeral, painting a house bright pink and purple in a modest, wellkept neighborhood, and going into greater debt to purchase an expensive TV. As a
specific example, the latter debt scenario is written as follows: “Sarah is getting more
and more into debt with her credit card. She recently bought lots of expensive new
clothes and costly furniture for her apartment. She could start saving her money but
instead is thinking of buying a very expensive hi-definition TV and going into greater
debt.” This scenario, for instance, intends to draw on motivations associated with
restraint from temptation and self-indulgence. The prescriptive scenarios involved
behaviors the person presumably should engage in to be considered moral. For example,
“While on campus, Jay is approached by a student asking if he could volunteer two hours
this weekend to help with a food drive for the local survival center. Jay doesn’t have
plans for the weekend. Jay is deciding whether to commit himself to helping with the
food drive.” For both proscriptive and prescriptive scenarios, participants are asked the
extent to which the person in the scenario should or should not engage in the behavior
(1= “feel very strongly s/he should not” to 9 = feel very strongly s/he should”). Morally
ambiguous scenarios are intentionally used to provide variation among participants’
responses. The scenarios are everyday in nature and do not entail punishment nor are
overtly threatening. Moreover, the scenarios are counterbalanced in terms of behaviors
about oneself versus others, and past studies have found the proscriptive and prescriptive
scenarios to be uniquely correlated with Carver and White’s (1994) measures of the
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Behavioral Inhibition System (avoidance orientation) and the Behavioral Activation
System (approach orientation) respectively (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).
Procedure
In pretesting I found some evidence that administering parenting measures that included
restrictiveness and punitiveness items picked up underlying sensitivities to prohibitions
when administered immediately before measures of morality. I was interested in whether
recalling personal past experiences with restrictive parents when answering the survey
would make salient a moral orientation focused on punitiveness, control, and threat—that
is, a proscriptive orientation. Presumably such a prohibition-based morality would only
be activated in this study for those recalling their parents as restrictive and punishing
during their childhood and adolescence.
Thus, after signing a consent form, student participants from the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst were randomly assigned either to complete the CRPR first
followed by the Moralisms Scale or to complete the Moralisms Scale first followed by
the CRPR. I expected stronger associations when the CRPR was administered before the
Moralisms Scale, in which case the CRPR would also function essentially as a prime for
proscriptive morality for those with restrictive parents. Lastly, they were asked in both
conditions to fill out a brief demographics questionnaire and thanked for participating in
the study.
Results and Discussion
A majority of this sample had biological mother and father figures: A total of 273
participants had biological mothers, 2 had adoptive mothers, 2 had stepmothers, and 2
replied “other,” while 259 had biological fathers, 2 had adoptive fathers, 10 had
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stepfathers, and 2 replied “other.” The overall means for the mother restrictiveness and
nurturance scales were 3.99 and 5.42, respectively, and those for the father restrictiveness
and nurturance scales were 3.95 and 4.95 respectively. Mother and father restrictiveness
were highly correlated, r(277) = .581, p <. 001, as were mother and father nurturance,
r(277) = .354, p <.001. We thus collapsed the scales into two parental scores (α’s > .90),
parental restrictiveness and parental nurturance, which had overall means of 3.98 and
5.18, respectively; the two scores were not correlated, r(206) = .04, n.s..
The mean scores for prescriptive moral judgments were calculated so that higher
numbers indicated stronger prescriptive orientation. To calculate the means scores for
the proscriptive moral judgments so that higher scores indicated stronger proscriptive
orientation, we subtracted participants’ scores from 9. Means for proscriptive and
prescriptive moral judgments were 5.93 and 6.78, respectively, and scores on the scales
were correlated, r(206) = .28, p < .001. Given this correlation, the following analyses
controlled for one form of moral judgment when looking at the other.
To test our hypothesis and explore the effect of the order of the parenting measure,
a multiple regression was conducted with parental restrictiveness, parental nurturance,
order manipulation (as a categorical variable), parental restrictiveness by order
manipulation interaction term, parental restrictiveness by nurturance interaction term, and
parental restrictiveness by nurturance by order manipulation interaction term as predictor
variables (See Table 1).1 There was no main effect of order manipulation, B =.085, p =
n.s.. There was a main effect of parental restrictiveness on proscriptive orientation, B
= .63, p < .001; however, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction
between parental restrictiveness and order of survey given, B = -.38, p = .01. Here,
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parental restrictiveness predicted a stronger proscriptive orientation when the CRPR was
given first compared to when it was given last. Higher accounts of parental
restrictiveness significantly predicted proscriptive orientation when the CRPR was
administered first B = 0.27, SE = 0.078, p < .001, but not when given second, B = -.11,
SE = .13, p = n.s. (see Figure 5). There was no significant main effect of parental
nurturance, B = -.02, p = n.s.; nor were there interactions between parental restrictiveness
and nurturance, B =.15, p = n.s., or between parental restrictiveness, nurturance, and
manipulation order, B = -.06, p = n.s.. As can be seen in Table 1, the same multiple
regression with prescriptive orientation produced no significant main effects or
interactions.
Overall, the findings of Study 1 suggest that restrictive parenting does in fact
socialize morality, and that individuals are oriented towards prohibitions as a function of
their restrictive past. More specifically, parental restrictiveness (but not nurturance)
predicted a proscriptive (but not prescriptive) orientation and, moreover, recalling one’s
parents as restrictive activated a dispositional sensitivity towards proscriptions.
In particular, the interaction between accounts of parental restrictiveness and
order manipulation suggests a difference between two types of dispositions: a chronic
proscriptive disposition and a proscriptive dispositional sensitivity. A chronic
proscriptive disposition manifests itself across all situations. A proscriptive dispositional
sensitivity manifests when interacting with proscriptive-inducing situations—such as
recalling past punitive interactions with their parental figures. For the former, a
relationship between parental restrictiveness and proscriptive orientation would have
expressed itself across all situations regardless of the order of the parenting measure.
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However, I found evidence for the latter: a relationship between parental restrictiveness
and proscriptive orientation manifested only when the parenting style measures came
before the proscriptive orientation measures. In particular, reading and answering items
about parental punitiveness activated an underlying sensitivity to prohibitions as a
function of the extent to which individuals perceived their parents to be restrictive.
The interaction between parental restrictiveness and order manipulation also
addresses issues of a potential bias in self-reports of socialization whereby recalling one’s
parents were restrictive may be an artifact of a more general negativity (e.g., a mere
responsivity to negative stimuli on the whole). The interaction findings suggest
otherwise: the association between parental restrictiveness and proscriptive moral
judgments is not due to an underlying third variable, but the former is instead a precursor
to the latter (which would not be the case if accounts of parental restrictiveness were an
artifact of an individual’s general negativity).
Although Baumrind’s (1966; 1967) parenting typology would mostly likely have
predicted authoritarian parents to socialize the strongest proscriptive orientation, the
interaction between restrictive and nurturant parenting was not significant. Parental
restrictiveness—with or without nurturance—predicted proscriptive judgments but not
prescriptive judgments. This pattern also rules out the possibility that scores on the
parenting scales were merely the result of an individual’s general negativity; if this were
the case, participants reporting that their parents were authoritarian would presumably be
the most proscriptively-oriented.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 2: TEMPTATION AND SHAME ARISE FROM RESTRICTIVE PARENTING
Study 1 found an association between parental restrictiveness and a proscriptive
orientation; in particular, recalling parents’ restrictiveness activated participants’
proscriptive orientation. In terms of development, restrictive parenting appears to
socialize a proscriptive orientation. However, past research has found that this harsh
parental control is often ineffective in curbing “anti-social” or “immoral” behaviors (e.g.,
Baumrind, 1991; Paulussen-Hoogeboom et al., 2007). Why would morally socialized
individuals display such tendencies? The purpose of Study 2 was to investigate the selfevaluative consequences of restrictive parenting, a key component to engaging in
“immoral” behaviors.
Restrictive parenting leads to a proscriptive orientation and, due to feature
positive monitoring processes, this avoidance-based orientation presumably leads to a
greater awareness of one’s failures (Carver and Scheier, 1982; Coats et al., 1996)—
failures of proscriptive inhibition, instances of one’s immorality. And given that in prior
work I have found shame to be a negative self-evaluative emotion engendered by a
proscriptive orientation (whereas guilt is associated with a prescriptive orientation;
Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), individuals with restrictive parents should be most
likely to feel shame.
This orientation towards prohibitions—what one should not do—should also lead
to a greater awareness of one’s temptations due to feature positive monitoring processes
(as a strategy to know what to avoid). Thus, restrictive parenting should also be
associated with greater ascribed temptation, a greater desire to actually engage in
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“immorality.” These are the very temptations that one was first motivated to inhibit. The
presence of these desires is then also likely to incur shame—“I am an immoral person,
capable and inclined to engage in immorality”—feelings of being a cheat, a thief, a liar.
Thus, individuals with restrictive parents not only have a greater awareness of
temptations, but those temptations are associated with an increased likelihood to feel
shame.
The following hypotheses were investigated in Study 2: (1) Restrictive parenting
positively predicts proneness to shame, but not guilt. (2) Restrictive parenting is also
positively associated with degree of temptation experienced. (3) Finally, because these
temptations are also associated with shame (“I must be immoral for having these
temptations”), temptation to engage in prohibited conduct mediates the relationship
between parental restrictiveness and feelings of shame. Given the findings of Study 1, I
did not predict any interactions between restrictiveness and nurturance to predict either
shame or temptation.
Following Study 1, these hypothesized associations should manifest when one’s
dispositional proscriptive sensitivity is activated; however, I wanted to use a
manipulation that would not directly activate proscriptive-related behaviors (e.g., with
statements entailing “should not”). I therefore administered the CRPR to activate
individual differences in parental restrictiveness. Answering the extent to which one’s
mother and father-figures were, for example, punitive, threatening, psychological and
physically controlling, should again (as in Study 1) activate a dispositional proscriptive
sensitivity. This study did not involve random assignment, but instead took advantage of
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real differences in proscriptive orientation assumed to exist in the population between
those whose parents are high on restrictive parenting items and those who are not.
Method
Participants
A total of 172 participants (135 women, 27 men, and 10 unidentified) completed
the study. In this sample, 121 participants reported that they were White, 24 Asian, 10
Black, and 3 Latino/a.
Materials
CRPR: Following Study 1, the CRPR (described above) was used to activate a
dispositional proscriptive sensitivity and to measure young adults’ retrospective accounts
of the extent to which their parental figures were restrictive and nurturing.
Temptation Scales: Two scales were administered as measure of temptation (see
Appendix C). Each scale listed 17 undesirable behaviors that were generated in a pretest
by University of Massachusetts, Amherst undergraduate students. The first scale was an
indirect measure of temptation used to bypass social desirability demands (projective
temptation measure). The prompts asked, “Regardless of actual behavior, to what extent
do you think the typical student at UMass would really want to engage in each of the
following behaviors? In other words, how tempted is the typical student to engage in each
of following behaviors? Please circle the number on the scale below from 1 (“Not at all
tempted”) to 7 (“Extremely tempted”).” This measure asked for participants’ judgments
of other people’s experiences under the assumption that they would project their own
desires onto them. The second was a direct measure of temptation (personal temptation),
and asked “Regardless of actual behavior, to what extent do you really want to engage in
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each of the following behaviors?...Please circle the number on the scale below from 1
(“Not at all tempted”) to 7 (“Extremely tempted”).” The behaviors, administered in the
same order for each scale, included: cheating on an exam or paper, sleeping around,
experimenting with drugs, destroying property, driving too fast or recklessly, skipping
class, and driving drunk. Given that the scales focused on “immoral” desires, students
may under-report the extent to which they feel tempted. On the other hand, having to
respond about others’ temptations may involve students projecting their own desires onto
them. In other words, I believe that asking about others’ temptations is likely to be a more
honest assessment of participants’ temptations than directly asking about their own
temptations. Reliability for each scale was acceptable (α’s > .84).
Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3R (TOSCA-3R), developed by Tangney, Dearing,
Wagner, & Gramzow (2000), was administered to assess proneness to shame and guilt
(see Appendix D). The TOSCA-3R consists of 16 scenarios with the prompt (Tangney &
Dearing, 2002; p. 207), “Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in dayto-day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations. As you read each
scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be
to react in each of the ways described.” An example of a scenario is the following: “You
make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you and
your boss criticizes you.” It is followed by items indirectly assessing shame and guilt
separately. For example, a shame item includes, “You would feel like you wanted to
hide” and a guilt item includes, “You would think, “I should have recognized the problem
and done a better job.’” Participants then rate their likelihood of responding in each
manner on a 5-point scale (1= “not likely” and 5 = “very likely”). Participants receive
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separate shame and guilt scores for each scenario, which are then averaged across
scenarios to generate overall shame and guilt scores.
Procedure: After signing a consent form, participants completed the CRPR and
were then asked to respond to the temptation measures, the TOSCA-3R, and a brief
demographics questionnaire. After the study, participants were debriefed and thanked for
participating in the study.
Results and Discussion
See Table 2 for correlations between parenting behaviors, temptation measures,
and moral emotions. Parental restrictiveness and parental nurturance scores were
calculated in the same way as in Study 1 with means of 3.93 and 5.16, respectively.
Scores on parental restrictiveness and nurturance in this study were negatively correlated,
r(172) = -.16, p = .031. The mean for the projective temptation scale was 4.75 while that
of the personal temptation was 3.38. Shame and guilt scores were 3.05 and 3.99; the
scores on the scales were highly correlated, r(164) = .47, p < .001. Past research has
statistically controlled for the high correlation between the two emotions when
investigating one emotion in particular (e.g., Tangney et al., 1992); similarly, the
following analyses also controlled for guilt when looking at shame.
To test the first hypothesis, a linear regression was run with parental
restrictiveness, nurturance, and guilt as potential predictors of shame. Parental
restrictiveness significantly predicted a proneness to shame, B = .18, p < .001, but
parental nurturance did not, B = -.06, p=n.s.. The negative bivariate correlation found
between parental nurturance and shame (see Table 2) disappears once parental
restrictiveness is considered. Regressing proneness to guilt on parental restrictiveness,
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nurturance, and shame, I found that restrictiveness did not predict guilt, B = -.04, p = n.s.,
but nurturance marginally predicted guilt, B = .07, p = .056. This is consistent with my
prior work (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010) linking guilt to failures of prescriptive
morality. Overall, the analyses supported the first hypothesis that parental restrictiveness
predicts a proneness to shame, but not guilt.
To test the second hypothesis, another linear regression was run with parental
restrictiveness and nurturance as predictors of projective temptation. Again, parental
restrictiveness significantly predicted projective temptation, B =.18, p = . 04, but
nurturance did not, B = .07, p = n.s.. Here, the higher parental restrictiveness, the greater
degree of temptation reported in the projective measure. Given the negligible
correlations between parenting style and personal temptation, it was not surprising that
neither parenting style was associated with that measure of temptation.
Given that past socialization research (e.g., Baumrind, 1972; Darling and
Steinberg, 1993) has found different behavioral and emotional patterns for white and
minority children of restrictive, authoritarian parents, I ran these two regression analyses
with non-white participants (however, my sample size was too small to look at individual
minority groups). Inconsistent with this prior literature, I found similar significant
patterns whereby parental restrictiveness predicted inclinations to feel shame, B = .24, p
= .026, and projective temptations, B = .41, p = .03.
To test hypothesis 3, whether projective temptation mediates the relationship
between restrictive parenting and shame, I ran a mediation analysis with restrictive
parenting, projective temptation, and shame. The analysis used the four steps specified by
Baron and Kenny (1986). In Step 1, the more restrictive one’s parents, the more shame
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expressed (B = .18, SE = .050, p < .001). In Step two, the more restrictive one’s parents,
the more projective temptation reported (B = .18, SE = .08, p = .04). In Step 3, however,
we found that restrictive parenting had a greater predictive value than temptation, (B
= .169, SE = .051, p = .003) while temptation became no longer significantly related to
shame (B = .063, SE = .040, p = n.s.). Hypothesis 3 was not supported: It seems that
restrictive parenting is associated with both temptation and shame, but temptation is not a
mediator between accounts of restrictive parenting and shame.
Another way to understand the findings from the first two regression analyses is
that the reason for the high correlation between parental restrictiveness and shame is
partly due to the nature of the relationship between parental restrictiveness and projective
temptation (as opposed to the relationship between temptation and shame, as in a
mediational analysis). In other words, those who recalled restrictive parents and
expressed temptations should experiences higher levels of shame. Testing for an
interaction between restrictive parenting and projective temptation to predict shameproneness would investigate whether the relationship between restrictive parenting and
shame-proneness was augmented by projective temptation. This analysis would test for
moderation rather than mediation; and although conducting an interaction typically
requires no relationship between the two continuous predictors, the correlation between
parental restrictiveness and projective temptation was significant but relatively low. The
interaction analysis was therefore conducted on an exploratory basis.
To explore this possibility, a multiple regression was conducted with parental
restrictiveness, projective temptation, projective temptation by parental restrictiveness
interaction term, and guilt-proneness as predictors of shame-proneness. A main effect of
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parental restrictiveness on shame, B = .18, p <.001, was qualified by a significant
interaction between parental restrictiveness and projective temptation in predicting
shame-proneness, B = .12, p < .001, and the effect was in the predicted direction (see
Figure 6). Although there was no main effect of projective temptation on shame, B = .03,
p = n.s., for relatively tempted participants (i.e., those at one standard deviation above the
mean), the relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame was strongly positive,
B = .65, SE = .08, p < .001. In other words, (projected) temptation was associated with
greater shame for those with restrictive parents. However, for those who projected low
levels of temptation (i.e., those at one standard deviation below the mean), the
relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame was negative, B = -.29, SE = .09,
p = .001. This finding may appear somewhat surprising, but still fits our argument: Here,
it seems as though for those who did not project temptation onto fellow students and may
therefore not have felt tempted in this context, parental restrictiveness was associated
with less shame—in other words, those with restrictive parents feel better (or, more
accurately, less bad) when they are less tempted.
Overall, the relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame depends on
the amount of temptation felt. Taken together with findings supporting hypothesis 1 and
2, the positive relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame is in part
accounted for by the one between parental restrictiveness and temptation; thus, we find
that as temptation increases, the relationship between parental restrictiveness and shame
increases too.
Another way to understand the results of the interaction analysis is that projective
temptation is positively associated with shame for those who have restrictive parents. In
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other words, a greater degree of temptation reported by those with restrictive parents was
more potent—shame-inducing, linked with proscriptive self-evaluations (Sheikh &
Janoff-Bulman, 2010), and a sense of immorality. The greater the parental restrictiveness,
the more distressing the temptations: a desire to “procrastinate,” for example, was not
only more likely, but also linked with greater self-condemnation.
However, this moderation (rather than mediation) finding also suggests that not
everyone with restrictive parents felt tempted. So although the second hypothesis was
supported, whereby parental restrictiveness predicted responses on the projective
temptation measure, the interaction results imply that there were people high on parental
restrictiveness who were also low on projective temptation, and were subsequently less
likely to experience shame. I cannot account for why some individuals high on parental
restrictiveness scored low on this temptation measure while others scored high on the
measure. However, I can still conclude that for individuals with restrictive parents, this is
a projective measure (such that reporting low temptations is related to low shame while
reported high temptation is related to high shame) and, more importantly, any feelings of
temptations are related to a proneness to shame.
Those with less restrictive parents, on the other hand, did not feel as bad—these
thoughts were not a cause for distress; instead, the relationship between projective
temptations and shame was actually found to be negative. The more individuals who
were low on parental restrictiveness reported projective temptation, the less likely they
were to feel shame. If participants did not have “immoral,” negatively potent temptations,
they still had to complete the measure—either by answering what they really thought the
typical student wants to do or by using their own desires that they don’t consider to be
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immoral (“I’d like to sleep around and that is all right”). Given that responses on the
personal temptation measure was not associated with any other measure, it is likely to be
the former: for individuals low on parental restrictiveness, it is as if expressing that the
typical student sleeps around, procrastinates, experiments with drugs, and so forth
reflected a tolerance for these behaviors rather than a projective desire to engage in “bad”
behaviors (as for those with restrictive parents). In other words, the individuals who did
not have restrictive parents may have thought, “Everyone does these behaviors and it’s
alright.”
Overall, there seems to be a very different role of the projective temptation
measure for different people, which may in fact account in part for why an interaction
rather than a mediational analysis predicted shame: If the projective temptation measured
assessed extent feeling tempted for those high on parental restrictiveness and assessed
beliefs of the extent to which other students are tempted for those low on parental
restrictiveness, then an interaction rather than a mediation makes sense. The interaction
between restrictive parenting and feeling temptation predicts shame-proneness. However,
if actual feelings of temptations were assessed for everyone (both high and low on
parental restrictiveness) I may have found it to mediate the relationship between parental
restrictiveness and proneness to shame.
Most importantly, Study 2 shows the greater potency of feeling tempted for the
child of restrictive parents—temptations are linked to shame-proneness. Unlike guilt,
shame has been associated with a host of detrimental outcomes: anxiety, low self-esteem,
depression, and what researchers have noted as a shame-induced rage (Tangney, Wagner,
Fletcher, and Gramzow, 1992; Tangney and Dearing, 2002). It has often been considered
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much more painful than guilt (Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984) and relates to aspects
of one’s immoral self that are deemed uncontrollable and persistent (Tracy and Robins,
2006). For individuals of restrictive parents, shame is a likely, yet unwanted, occurrence,
only amplified by feelings of temptation. As an emotion entailing motivations of
inhibition and denial, these potent temptations are likely to lead to attempts at
suppression, leading to more detrimental outcomes, which is the focus of Study 3.2
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY 3: THE EGO DEPLETING EFFECTS OF PROHIBITIONS
One might assume that greater attention given to temptations may aid in
successfully restraining from engaging in the associated “immoral” behaviors. Study 2
showed the negative potency associated with these immoral thoughts for individuals with
highly restrictive parents—as they felt more tempted, they expressed a greater proneness
to shame. For these individuals, having temptations brought to their attention is more
damning in terms of self-evaluation—it implicates immorality, a weakness of will, a
“bad” self—and to rid these thoughts, mental suppression is a likely strategy. Given this
potency, suppression of temptations should be more difficult for those with restrictive
parents compared to those who do not have restrictive parents and don’t associate shame
with their temptations. Moreover, due to the ironic consequences of mental suppression,
these immoral temptations are likely to rebound and come to one’s attention even more,
painfully highlighting one’s failures at suppression. As noted earlier, research has
consistently demonstrated the ego depleting effects of engaging in mental suppression
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister, et al., 2007; Muraven et al., 1998). Thus,
restrictive parenting may (unintentionally) make mental suppression of immoral thoughts
and temptations harder, taking up resources for self-control against engaging in those
very temptations. The purpose of Study 3 was to experimentally test the greater ego
depleting effects of mental suppression for those who have restrictive parents compared
to those who do not.
Although I could not observe if proscriptively oriented individuals are mentally
suppressing immoral thoughts, I could induce mental suppression and investigate whether
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proscriptively-oriented individuals were the most ego depleted. Instead of using the
CRPR to activate one’s dispositional proscriptive sensitivity, Study 3 experimentally
primed a proscriptive orientation to investigate the causal effect of proscriptive
orientation and mental suppression on ego depletion. Given the results of Studies 1 and 2,
I hypothesized another moderating role of restrictive parenting: a proscriptive prime
would interact with accounts of parental restrictiveness (measuring one’s dispositional
proscriptive sensitivity) to incur ego depletion. Awareness of immoral thoughts are most
damning for those with restrictive parents; they will thus have the hardest time engaging
in mental suppression, resulting in being the most depleted of self-control resources. In
other words, I hypothesized that participants with restrictive parents who are
proscriptively primed show the greatest ego depleting effects.
Method
Participants
A total of 68 participants completed the study, but 12 participants (roughly half
from each condition) were dropped from analyses for not following the suppression
instructions. This is not surprising given the relative difficulty of the suppression task
(see below and Wegner et al., 1987). A total of 56 participants (45 women and 11 men)
remained, of whom 38 reported that they were White, 7 Asian, 6 Black, and 5 Latino/a.
There were 28 participants in each priming condition.
Materials
CRPR: As in Study 1 and Study 2, the CRPR (described above) was administered
to assess young adults’ retrospective accounts of the extent to which their parental figures
were restrictive and nurturing.
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Moral Priming Manipulation: Participants were randomly assigned to either a
proscriptive prime or a prescriptive prime condition (see Appendix E). In both conditions
participants were informed that we were interested in morality: “Each of us has our own
way of understanding right and wrong. We are interested in your views. What comes to
mind when you think about how to be moral or not be immoral?” Participants in the
prescriptive condition were asked to indicate what they should do, whereas participants in
the proscriptive condition were asked what they should not do. Each group was provided
with the phrase “To be moral or not be immoral” followed by 10 lines, each preceded by
the stem “I should” (prescriptive condition) or “I should not” (proscriptive condition)
and were asked to fill in as many lines as they could.
Pictures with mental suppression induction: Three pre-tested pictures (see
Appendix F) that were most likely to elicit descriptions of prohibited behaviors were
presented to participants with the following instructions: “Please describe in several
sentences what you think is going on in the picture below in as much detail as you can.
What are the people in the picture below thinking, feeling, and doing? Please do NOT use
any words related to bad, immoral, undesirable behaviors, intentions, or outcomes (e.g.,
sneaky).” These instructions were adapted from Liberman and Forster (2000), who have
used them successfully in the past to induce mental suppression.
Stroop Task: Based on prior research (e.g., Richeson and Shelton, 2003), the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was used as a measure of ego depletion (see Appendix G). In
this task, participants were presented one at a time with stimuli in green, yellow, red, or
blue. The stimuli included a string of Xs (e.g., Xs in green type; control trials), a name of
a color presented in a congruent color (e.g., “green” in green type; congruent trials) or a

42

name of a color presented in an incongruent color (e.g., “green” in yellow type;
incongruent trials). They were instructed to identify the color in which the stimulus was
printed as quickly and as accurately as possible. Each stimulus appeared for 2000ms and
then timed out. The incongruent trials ostensibly elicit interference, forcing participants
to override their natural inclination to read the word instead, and taking longer to respond
to compared to control or congruent trials.
Based on prior research (e.g., Richeson and Shelton, 2003; Richeson and
Trawalter, 2005), all times greater than 2000 ms were recoded as 2000 ms and all times
less than 200 ms were recoded as 200 ms. There were a total of 84 experimental trials,
and time taken to identify the color in which each stimulus was presented was recorded
such that participants received a mean score for control trials, incongruent trials, and
congruent trials. The means were then log-transformed for normality,3 and the
interference scores were calculated by subtracting the log transformed mean for the
control trials from that of the incongruent trials.4 Here, Stroop interference represents
ego depletion: the larger the stoop interference score, the greater one’s ego depletion.
Procedure
After completing the proscriptive versus prescriptive priming manipulation,
participants were presented with the three pictures and the suppression instructions. They
were then given the Stroop task in order to measure the ego depletion effects of the
priming manipulation. To test whether the effects of proscriptive orientation were
moderated by dispositional proscriptive sensitivity, participants were then asked to
respond to the CRPR followed by a brief demographics questionnaire.
Results and Discussion
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Means for parental restrictiveness and nurturance were 4.02 and 5.12, respectively,
and scores on restrictiveness and nurturance were negatively correlated r(56) = -.34, p
= .012. The Stroop interference mean was 138.1 ms and ranged from -73.64 to 1139.1
ms. There were no significant correlations between Stroop interference and either
parental restrictiveness, r(56) = .08, p = n.s., or nurturance, r(56) =.02, p = n.s..
To test for the hypothesized interaction between the proscriptive prime and
accounts of parental restrictiveness on ego depletion, a multiple regression was conducted
with the moral priming conditions (categorical variable), parental restrictiveness,
nurturance, and priming condition by parental restrictiveness as predictors of ego
depletion (see Table 3). As shown in Figure 7, a significant interaction between priming
condition and parental restrictiveness was found. In particular, the proscriptive prime
caused more ego depletion compared to the prescriptive prime as a function of parental
restrictiveness (B = -0.14, SE = 0.07, p = 0.05). Moreover, parental restrictiveness was
positively associated with more ego depletion in the proscriptive priming condition (B =
0.10, SE = 0.05, p = .03), but there was no significant relationship between the two in the
prescriptive condition (B = -.04, SE = .05, p = n.s.).
Although one might assume that a proscriptive orientation should foster greater
successful restraint of tempting thoughts and behaviors, the results of Study 3 would
suggest otherwise. Supporting my hypothesis, situational activation of a proscriptive
orientation followed by suppression of proscriptive thoughts interacted with parental
restrictiveness to incur the most ego depletion. When parents were reported as restrictive,
a proscriptive (but not prescriptive) orientation made it harder to suppress “immoral”
thoughts, presumably incurring more rebound effects and more frequent confrontations
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with one’s “bad” self, ultimately resulting in the most ego-depletion, the greatest loss of
self-control. Past research has found that merely engaging in mental suppression leads to
ego depletion (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998); thus, suppression should be ego depleting for
people in both conditions. However, those who do not have thoughts with such negative
potency (e.g., primed with a prescriptive orientation), who do not infer immorality from
their failures, do not suffer such depletion. In the end, a proscriptive activation left
participants whose parents were restrictive with the fewest self-control resources to fight
temptations.
It is important to note that individuals with restrictive parents are not depleted
across all situations, but rather only when a proscriptive orientation is situationally
activated. And this makes sense: a person with a restrictive socialization history may not
be different from anyone else until placed in a context that elicits thoughts about
(im)morality, specifically those concerning prohibitions. For example, having thoughts
of gambling will deplete psychic resources in a context in which that temptation is
activated—say, a casino. Similarly, thoughts of cheating are likely to be highly depleting
in an exam, thoughts of drinking excessively are likely to be most depleting at a bar, etc.
It seems that individuals with restrictive, punitive parents may be tempted to engage in
“anti-social” behaviors not because of a lack of moral socialization, but due to
consequences incurred by the interaction between one’s past socialization and one’s
current environment.
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CHAPTER V
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The most prevalent account in psychology of the role of punishment on moral
socialization argues that, due to the external attribution for control, children of punitive
parents are less likely to internalize norms of right and wrong. The results of the three
studies, however, suggest otherwise: restrictive, punitive parenting does activate a sense
of morality—but this sense is mainly proscriptive (Study 1). Accounts of restrictive
parents predicted a proscriptive orientation, and not a prescriptive orientation. In
particular, recounting the degree of parental restrictiveness—the extent to which they
used punishment, threat, and physical and/or psychological control—activated a
mirroring proscriptive orientation. If one’s parents were highly restrictive, a strong
proscriptive orientation was activated; if one’s parents were not at all restrictive, a
proscriptive orientation was not activated.
And although a likelihood to “act out" (e.g., Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; Lepper,
1983; Lepper & Greene, 1976) and a greater proneness to shame (Tangney and Dearing,
2002) seem like contradictory findings from an external justification account, they make
sense from a motivational perspective. Due to feature positive monitoring, parental
restrictiveness predicts a proneness to shame and feelings of temptations such that shame
is amplified by the presence of temptation (Study 2). Because individuals with restrictive
parents are vigilant against proscriptive immorality, the presence of temptations is related
to shame-inducing self evaluations; temptations are more distressing for them. The
negative potency of temptations makes mental suppression of these unwanted thoughts
more difficult, having real consequences for the depletion of one’s self-regulatory
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resources (Study 3): not only are the temptations distressing but they also take up energy,
leaving one ironically less prepared to control moral lapses.
Although much of the socialization literature on parenting styles uses parents’
reports of their disciplinary style or an outside observer to predict psychological and
behavioral outcomes (Grusec and Goodnow, 1994), our work was interested in young
adults’ retrospective accounts of their parents’ behaviors. The individual’s perceptions of
his or her parents, whether real or imagined, play a key role in that individual’s
disposition and way of looking at the world. Indeed, the “objective” occurrences
influence the child’s moral orientation through the meanings accorded by the child to
those occurrences. For example, Bowlby (1978; 1981) argued that early social
interactions leading to maladaptive cognitive models arise from children’s inferences
“about their acceptability and lovableness” from those early interactions (Brewin,
Andrews, & Gotlib, 1993, p.82). These meanings of “acceptability” and “lovableness”
are then what lead to certain cognitive styles, motivational orientations, and behavioral
and psychopathological patterns.
Even so, evidence on the accuracy of retrospective reports has found that
individuals’ accounts of their childhood mirror the accounts provided by their parents,
and children often remember early parent-child interactions more accurately than the
parents (who tend to exhibit self-serving biases; Brewin et al., 1993). Moreover,
evidence argues for the temporal stability of self-reports of past childhood events across
mood and psychopathological states such as depression (e.g., Brewin et al., 1993; Manian,
Strauman, and Denney, 1998, Parker, 1981). Overall, in their review of retrospective
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reports of childhood, Brewin et al. (1993) concluded, “the central features of
[autobiographical] accounts are likely to be reasonably accurate.”
Study 1 showed in particular that individual differences in recalling past parental
restrictiveness activates a dispositional proscriptive sensitivity. In terms of moral
socialization, restrictive parenting socializes an orientation towards prohibitions that
interacts with one’s current environment. A pattern of results emerged in the studies that
did not suggest that the measure of parental restrictiveness merely assessed a broad
trait/dispositional negativity. Rather, parental restrictiveness had a directional effect on
proscriptive orientation; the relationship between the two only occurred when the
parental restrictiveness measure was administered before the proscriptive orientation
measure. In other words, recalling one’s parents as highly restrictive, threatening, and
controlling activated a proscriptive orientation. Moreover, parental restrictiveness was
not associated with all negative measures: it specifically predicted a proneness to shame,
but not guilt, another “negative” moral emotion (however, this makes sense given guilt’s
relation to prescriptive rather than proscriptive orientation; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman,
2010). Thus, although a longitudinal study assessing parental restrictiveness would have
been ideal, there is evidence from this project and from past literature (e.g., Brewin et al.,
1993) that the CRPR is a generally accurate measure of restrictive parenting style rather
than an indirect measure of a general negativity. These studies are the first attempt to
understand the regulatory nature of parental restrictiveness, but future work should
directly test these associations using longitudinal designs.
Interestingly, the role of parental restrictiveness in the studies also highlights the
interactional nature between the person and the situation. Having to read and recall one’s
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parents as threatening in the CRPR before the proscriptive items in the Moralisms Scale
(the order manipulation) interacted with the reports of parental restrictiveness to predict
proscriptive orientation in Study 1. Moreover, having to write down moral statements
starting with “I should not” (the proscriptive prime) interacted with reports of parental
restrictiveness to predict ego depletion in Study 3. It seems as though both personality
and situation are important to understand the regulatory nature of parental restrictiveness.
Past research has in fact studied self-regulation both as a personality trait and as a
situational, context-driven construct. For example, Elliot and Thrash (2002) have argued
that approach and avoidance motivations are stable temperaments that represent the
foundation of several different approaches to personality. In particular, they found that
measures of extraversion and neuroticism (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992), positive and
negative emotionality (e.g., Watson & Clark, 1993), and the Behavioral Activation
System and the Behavioral Inhibition System (e.g., Carver & White, 1994) assess
underlying approach versus avoidance personality traits, which are stable temperaments
carried across different contexts. In contrast, other self-regulation researchers have
focused on the contextual aspects of self-regulation (e.g., Higgins, 1998; Friedman &
Förster, 2001). For example, Friedman and Förster (2001) situationally primed
individuals with either approach or avoidance motivation using a maze task that activates
“seeking reward” or “avoiding punishment” respectively and have found that this
situational manipulation affects subsequent cognitive processes. An interaction between
the present environment and one’s personal socialization history shows that both person
and situation matter in psychology—personal histories show themselves in the present,
but mainly through interacting with one’s current environment. For example, one’s
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personal history of parents’ being restrictive may not matter in everyday contexts, but do
matter when punitiveness, threat, or proscriptive morality is environmentally activated. It
is important then to understand dispositions, at least when taking socialization histories
into account (as found in this project), not as chronically manifesting themselves in every
situation, but as arising when the environment pulls for them. This is a dynamic
relationship between the person and the situation.
Parental restrictiveness seems to socialize a focus on moral prohibitions, which
then interact with one’s environment to produce emotional, evaluative, and behavioral
outcomes. The socialization of these moral psychological processes not only pertains to
interpersonal harm, justice, and fairness (as traditionally argued by the liberal philosophic
perspective; e.g., Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Turiel, 1983, 2002), but also everyday behaviors
such as drinking, cleanliness, and eating—conduct not typically considered in the realm
of morality. In fact, cultural psychologists (e.g., Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990;
Shweder, 1991; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993) have
argued that the domain of morality especially across cultures often extends past harm,
rights, and justice. Haidt (1993), for example, has shown that offensive violations of
what are typically thought of as social conventions, such as those involving sexual
behaviors, work ethic, and cleanliness--that are in fact harmless--often elicit moral
reactions. Taking this perspective into account, the measures in this project used
behaviors involving personal conduct such as eating behavior (see the Moralisms Scale;
Study 1) and interpersonal harm such as cheating on one’s partner (see the Projective
Measure Scale; Study 2), as well as those generated by participants themselves (see the
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moral primes; Study 3). Thus, the measures in this project surveyed all types of
behaviors that people regard as part of morality.
Moreover, the reactions involving moral psychological processes are largely
motivational and emotional, rather than solely cognitive as represented by the work of
Kohlberg (1984). Kohlberg (1984) argued that moral development paralleled cognitive
development (see Piaget, 1977), where the child “rationally” constructs his or her moral
worldview through a series of stages that lead to a universally held moral system valuing
justice. However, the studies in this project showed that moral motivations arising from
relational encounters (e.g., a proscriptive orientation arising from parental restrictiveness)
underlie one’s moral judgments, emotional experiences, and behavioral tendencies. A
person’s moral worldview is then not necessarily the product of rational deliberation but
often the outcome of relational and motivational processes.
Limitations and Future Research
Future research not only should investigate the effects of parental restrictiveness
longitudinally, but also explore whether the patterns found in this project generalize to
non-college participants. In a way, it is somewhat surprising that the relationship
between temptation and shame, and its effect on mental suppression and ego depletion,
arose in college students. One could argue that these participants are least likely to be
“delinquent” and may therefore be most likely to have nurturing parents and thus not
have to deal with “immoral” temptations. A non-college student sample—and one with
more men--might find stronger relationships between restrictive parenting, temptations,
and shame—as well as greater depleting effects of suppressing immoral thoughts.
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This project focused on restrictive parenting and proscriptive morality. Future
research also ought to investigate socialization precursors of a prescriptive orientation
possibly arising from parental nurturance. In prior work (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, in
press), I have argued that from nurturing interactions with one’s parents arise a valued,
loved sense of oneself and the ability to care for others. Rather than a vigilance to avoid
punishment, warmth and care are rewarding goals achieved through enacting the
“shoulds”—a prescriptive orientation. Indeed, past socialization research has found early,
secure attachment and parental nurturance socialize prosocial conduct and self-reliance
(Grusec, Goodnow, and Cohen, 1996; for a review see Grusec, Davidov, & Lundell, 2002;
Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Sadovsky, 2006; Hastings, Utendale, & Sullivan, 2007); these are
behaviors associated with a prescriptive orientation.
Although this project focused on the consequences restrictive parenting, I did not
find any systematic evidence for the predictive value of the CRPR measure of parental
nurturance as a prescriptive regulator (besides its correlation with guilt-proneness).
However, the means for parental nurturance in all three studies were over 5 (out of 7).
Such high scores on parental nurturance may mean that any existing correlations between
parental nurturance and prescriptive orientation (as well as any interactions between
nurturance and restrictiveness) may be difficult to uncover in a student population
because of ceiling effects. Moreover, nurturance items in the modified version of the
Child Rearing Practices Report (Rickel and Biasetti, 1984) measured not only instances
of affective warmth (e.g., “Expressed affection by hugging, kissing, and holding me”)
and encouragement (e.g., “Let me know s/he appreciated what I tried or accomplished”),
but arguably also items assessing more permissiveness and/or non-traditionalism (e.g.,
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“Felt I should have time to think, daydream, and even loaf sometimes”). Future work on
disentangling a parental nurturance factor from others may help further investigate its
relation to a prescriptive orientation.
Future research on temptations as a function of parental restrictiveness should
address the limitations of the projective temptation scale used in Study 2: this measure
does not seem to function as a projective measure for everyone. Future work should also
investigate the question of number of temptations arising in the consciousness of
proscriptively-oriented individuals. Specifically, the structure of the projective
temptation measure in Study 2 assessed degree of temptation (“to what extent do you feel
the typical student…is tempted to engage in the following behaviors…?”) rather than the
quantity of accessible temptations due to feature positive monitoring (e.g., “how many
temptations does the typical student experience?”). Thus, findings in Study 2 concerned
shame associated with feeling tempted as assessed via a “projective” of others’
temptations. Yet given that amount of temptations (i.e., the “number” of accessible
temptations) was not measured in Study 2, we cannot empirically conclude that shame is
also related to the latter. In other words, the affective aspects of temptation were
assessed—the degree of temptation and associated proneness to shame— rather than the
sheer quantity of temptations accessible to individuals with restrictive parents. Future
work should measure the number of accessible temptations for everyone and test its
mediating role between parental restrictiveness and shame.
Relatedly, I argued in Study 3 that proscriptively-oriented individuals incur the
most depletion because their thoughts and temptations are more potent and subsequently
harder to suppress compared to thoughts and temptations that are not used for negative
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self-evaluations. However, an additional (untested) reason for the depletion may exist:
on top of having thoughts and temptations that were more potent, proscriptively-oriented
individuals may also have struggled with a greater number of accessible immoral
thoughts and temptations during the mental suppression induction. In theorizing about
the relationship between restrictiveness-proscriptive morality and temptations, I argued
that both number and potency would be affected. If the number of temptations also
relates to shame, it is another reason why mental suppression of immoral thoughts would
ironically be the hardest for those in a proscriptive orientation and most ego depleting.
Past research on ego depletion has not only found mental suppression but also
resisting tempting behaviors to have depleting effects. For example, Baumeister et al.
(1998) reported that hungry participants who had to restrain themselves from eating
chocolate cookies that were in front of them subsequently gave up faster on an unrelated
difficult puzzle task compared with those who either were able to eat the cookie as well
as those who were not tempted by any cookies. Self-regulation here involves the
physical act of restraint (and not necessarily the mental aspect of suppression, which was
the focus of Study 3), which is also likely to be relevant for proscriptively-oriented
individuals: physically resisting from cheating on my partner is ego depleting in itself—
and is likely to be even more ego depleting if the temptations are in themselves potent,
resulting in an increased likelihood of future lapses of self-regulation. This aspect of ego
depletion was not the focus of Study 3, but is also an important avenue for future research.
Implications of Project
Although this project focused on parental influences in moral socialization, I
expect other socialization figures such as other relatives, teachers, and religious figures,
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as well as broader systems of socialization such as educational and religious systems to
engender a similar regulatory orientation. Punitive socialization agents are also likely to
orient individuals towards prohibitions, making them more aware of temptations and
more likely to feel shame. This may often work towards the socialization agent’s benefit:
for example, an authoritarian social structure may orient people towards their own
immorality, occupying themselves with curbing their own temptations and shame,
valuing inhibition and thus perpetuating the existing social order, rather than activating
positive obligations or social justice motives (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2007) towards others.
This strong sensitivity towards one’s own immorality may also result in a
defensive, punitive orientation towards others, a phenomenon known as “reaction
formation.” Taking an overly condemnatory stance towards other people’s behaviors
may serve as a defensive strategy to mitigate the distress and shame associated with one’s
own temptations. Moral emotions researchers (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Tangney et al., 1992;
Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996; Thomaes, Stegge, &
Olthof, 2010) have also noted that the threat of immorality and pain associated with
shame can also be externalized into severe rage and aggression towards others; here,
hostility towards others is in part motivated by attenuating one's own shame and blaming
others for one’s pain. Both of these processes may lead one’s own perceived immorality
to increase a (hypocritical) harsh and punitive stance towards others.
Although appropriate uses of restrictiveness may certainly guard against harmful,
even potentially dangerous, behaviors, using punishment and threat of punishment as the
primary mode of discipline and communication from parent to child produces a
motivational orientation with ultimately detrimental consequences. By integrating theory
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and methods in socialization, moral psychology, motivation, and social cognition, I hope
to have provided a new understanding of punishment in a relational context. Punishment
is not completely ineffective in moral socialization (as advocated by the external
justification perspective), but socializes one type of moral orientation, a focus on
prohibitions; this perspective outlines a more comprehensive and paradoxical route to
moral lapses. Here, individuals are not reacting against external demands—the
“forbidden fruit” effect. Rather, their attempts to be moral are what paradoxically lead to
a greater inclination to engage in what they themselves view as immoral conduct.
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ENDNOTES
1. All continuous variables entered in all regressions reported in the paper were centered.
2. Projective temptation is an indirect measure of one’s own temptations; if it were on the
other hand an indicator of some real perception of others’ temptations unbiased by one’s
own inclinations we would likely see a different pattern of correlations. For example, it
is possible that individuals with restrictive parents view others as struggling with
“immoral” temptations that they themselves have under control. In this case, however,
we would not expect the positive relationship found between parental restrictiveness and
shame-proneness, and would also assume a negative correlation between parental
restrictiveness and personal temptation (but rather found one close to zero).
3. For ease of interpretation, all interference scores are presented as the untransformed
values.
4. Because reaction times for the congruent trials often reflect facilitation effects, they
were not used in the analyses (e.g., Richeson and Shelton, 2003).
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Table 1. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Proscriptive and Prescriptive
Orientations
PROSCRIPTIVE
ORIENTATION

PRESCRIPTIVE
ORIENTATION

B

SE

B

SE

Parental Restrictiveness

.63**

.203

.16

.17

Order Manipulation

.085

.13

-.13

.11

Parental
Restrictiveness*Order

-.38*

.15

-.08

.02

Parental Nurturance

-.02

.06

.08

.05

Parental
Restrictiveness*Parental
Nurturance
Parental
Restrictiveness*Parental
Nurturance*Order

.15

.19

-.17

.16

-.06

.14

.10

.11

Note. B is the unstandardized regression coefficient.
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Table 2. Correlations with Parenting Scale, Projective Measures, and Moral Emotions

1) Parental
Restrictiveness
2) Parental
Nurturance
3) Projective
Temptation
Scale
4)Personal
Temptation
Scale
5) Shame

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

-.16*

.15*

.04

.30**

-.10

.05

-.002

-.17*

.14

.50*

.09*

-.02

.16*

-.18*

.47**

Note. 6) = Guilt.
Correlations presented for shame and guilt are controlling for each other.
*p<.05. **p<.01.

59

Table 3: Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Ego Depletion

EGO DEPLETION
B

SE

Priming Manipulation

-.02

.05

Parental Restrictiveness

.02

.04

Parental Nurturance

.02

.03

Priming Manipulation*Parental
Restrictiveness

-.14*

.07

Note. B is the unstandardized regression coefficient.
*p<.05. **p<.01.
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Figure 1. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 1)
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Figure 2. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 2)
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Figure 3. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 2)

Restrictive
Parenting

Proscriptive
Orientation

Temptation

Shame

Mental
Suppression

Ego
Depletion

63

Figure 4. The Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions (Study 3)
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Figure 5. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Proscriptive Moral Orientation as a Function of
Accounts of Parental Restrictiveness and Order of Measures Manipulation
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Figure 6. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Shame-Proneness as a Function of Accounts of
Parental Restrictiveness and Projective Temptation
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Figure 7. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Stroop Interference as a Function of Accounts of
Parental Restrictiveness and Moral Priming Conditions
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APPENDIX A
MODIFIED VERSION OF THE CHILD REARING PRACTICES REPORT
We are interested in your recollections of how your parental figures interacted with you.
We will ask you about your interactions with both a mother and a father figure. Please
indicate below the mother figure about which you will be completing this form.
Mother figure (circle one):
Biological
Adoptive

Stepmother

Other___________

Now please consider each statement on the following pages in regards to your mother
figure. Using the scale below, indicate how closely it describes your relationship with
your mother figure.
not at all:____1___:____2___:____3___:____4___:____5___:____6___:____7___: very much so

Mother
Figure
Let me know how much she sacrificed for me.

______

Shared many warm, intimate times together.

______

Expected me to be grateful and appreciate all the advantages I had.

______

Encouraged me to talk about my troubles.

______

Joked and played with me.

______

Taught me that in one way or another punishment would find me
when I was bad.

______

Let me know she appreciated what I tried or accomplished.

______

Encouraged me to keep control of my feelings at all times.

______

Encouraged me to wonder and think about life.

______

Did not believe children should have secrets from their parents.

______

Felt I should have time to think, daydream, and even loaf
sometimes.

______

Used to control me by warning me of all the bad things that could
happen to me.

______

Expressed affection by hugging, kissing, and holding me.

______
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Did not allow me to say bad things about my teachers.

______

Talked it over and reasoned with me when I misbehaved.

______

Dreaded answering my questions about sex.

______

Found being with her children interesting and educational – even for
long periods of time.

______

Thought that scolding and criticism would make me improve.

______

Encouraged me to be curious, to explore and question things.

______

Used to tell me how ashamed and disappointed she felt when I
misbehaved.

______

Some of her greatest satisfactions were gotten from her children.

______

Wanted me to make a good impression on others.

______

Let me know when she was angry.

______

Tried to keep me away from children or families who had different
ideas or values from our own.

______

Respected my opinions and encourage me to express them.

______

Encouraged me to do things better than others.

______

Gave me comfort and understanding when I was scared or upset.

______

Expected me not to get dirty while I was playing.

______

Was easy going and relaxed with me.

______

Didn't want me looked upon as different from others.

______

Trusted me to behave as I should, even when she was not around.

______

Did not believe that young children of different sexes should be
allowed to see each other naked.

______

Emphasized praising me when I was good more than punishing me
when I was bad.

______

Did not allow me to question her decisions.

______

Thought a child should be seen and not heard.

______

Did not allow me to get angry with her.

______
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Believed in starting toilet training as soon as possible.

______

Took into account my preferences were when making plans for the
family.

______

Did not want me to try things if she thought I might fail.

______

Didn't believe I should be given sexual information until I could
understand everything.

______

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Please indicate below the father figure about which you will be completing this form.
Father figure (circle one):
Biological Adoptive
Stepfather

Other___________

Now please consider each statement on the following pages in regards to your father
figure. Using the scale below, indicate how closely it describes your relationship with
your father figure.
not at all:____1___:____2___:____3___:____4___:____5___:____6___:____7___: very much so

Father
Figure
Let me know how much he sacrificed for me.

______

Shared many warm, intimate times together.

______

Expected me to be grateful and appreciate all the advantages I had.

______

Encouraged me to talk about my troubles.

______

Joked and played with me.

______

Taught me that in one way or another punishment would find me
when I was bad.

______

Let me know he appreciated what I tried or accomplished.

______

Encouraged me to keep control of my feelings at all times.

______

Encouraged me to wonder and think about life.

______

Did not believe children should have secrets from their parents.

______
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Felt I should have time to think, daydream, and even loaf
sometimes.

______

Used to control me by warning me of all the bad things that could
happen to me.

______

Expressed affection by hugging, kissing, and holding me.

______

Did not allow me to say bad things about my teachers.

______

Talked it over and reasoned with me when I misbehaved.

______

Dreaded answering my questions about sex.

______

Found being with his children interesting and educational – even for
long periods of time.

______

Thought that scolding and criticism would make me improve.

______

Encouraged me to be curious, to explore and question things.

______

Used to tell me how ashamed and disappointed he felt when I
misbehaved.

______

Some of his greatest satisfactions were gotten from his children.

______

Wanted me to make a good impression on others.

______

Let me know when he was angry.

______

Tried to keep me away from children or families who had different
ideas or values from our own.

______

Respected my opinions and encourage me to express them.

______

Encouraged me to do things better than others.

______

Gave me comfort and understanding when I was scared or upset.

______

Expected me not to get dirty while I was playing.

______

Was easy going and relaxed with me.

______

Didn't want me looked upon as different from others.

______

Trusted me to behave as I should, even when he was not around.

______

Did not believe that young children of different sexes should be
allowed to see each other naked.

______
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Emphasized praising me when I was good more than punishing me
when I was bad.

______

Did not allow me to question his decisions.

______

Thought a child should be seen and not heard.

______

Did not allow me to get angry with him.

______

Believed in starting toilet training as soon as possible.

______

Took into account my preferences were when making plans for the
family.

______

Did not want me to try things if he thought I might fail.

______

Didn't believe I should be given sexual information until I could
understand everything.

______
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APPENDIX B
THE MORALISMS SCALE
Some decisions are “up to you”---there isn’t a clear right or wrong answer, or a better or
worse choice. One such decision might be choosing a flavor of ice cream. Such
decisions are completely a matter of personal preference. Other decisions, such as killing
an innocent person are clearly matters of right or wrong behavior and not matters of
personal preference.
For each situations described below first indicate (i.e., circle the number) indicate how
strongly you feel the person in the scenario should or should not engage in the behavior
presented. There are no correct answers, so please just choose the number on the scales
below that best represents your response.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. Tim is overweight and has already eaten two hamburgers and a large order of
fries. He is full, but he really likes the onion rings at the restaurant, so he considers
ordering a third burger and an order of onion rings.
To what extent do you feel Tim should or should not order the third burger and onion rings?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

2. Stacy is a pre-med student and has an early morning chemistry class. She intends
to go to class, but finds it hard to get up early. She could just miss class and get the
notes from other students, but considers waking up early anyway to get to class on
time.
To what extent do you feel Stacy should get up, attend class, and take the notes herself?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

3. Sheila is going to a funeral, and it’s an unusually hot day. She is thinking of
wearing a skimpy, revealing dress to keep her relatively cool at the funeral.
To what extent do you feel Sheila should or should not wear a skimpy, revealing dress to the
funeral?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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4. Mary walks by a homeless man on the street, and he asks if she can spare some
change. There’s a local shelter that costs $2.00 a night that Mary knows about.
Mary could just walk past the homeless man, but considers giving him the $2.00
instead.
To what extent do you feel Mary should or should not give the homeless man money?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

5. Sam really likes pornography on the web. He already spent two hours earlier in
the day on an online pornography site. He just returned to his apartment and
considers immediately going online to a pornography website.
To what extent do you feel Sam should or should not immediately go online to a pornography
website?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

6. Jason has a big project to complete for an important client, and it is due by the
end of the day. He knows he could give the work to two new interns, but he
considers staying late and doing a good job finishing the project himself.
To what extent do you feel Jason should or should not stay late and finish the project himself?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

7. Susan has a large friendly dog who likes to run free. There is a leash law in her
town that states dogs should be leashed in public, but Susan is thinking of letting her
dog run free on the bike trail in town.
To what extent do you feel Susan should or should not let her dog run free on the bike trail in
town?
feel very strongly
she should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

8

feel very strongly
she should
9

8. Cory is in the supermarket, where he sees an elderly woman having trouble
carrying her groceries. He is in a hurry and knows he could ignore her, but
considers instead helping the elderly woman carry her groceries.
To what extent do you feel Cory should or should not help the elderly woman with her groceries?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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9. Linda had a great time with Bob. When they go back to her apartment, it’s clear
she and Bob want to have sex. Neither of them have contraceptive protection, but
they consider having sex anyway.
To what extent do you feel Linda and Bob should or should not have sex anyway?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
they should not
neutral
they should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10. Jill is applying for a competitive year-long internship. Her uncle knows someone
at the firm that is offering the internship. Jill could ask her uncle to pull strings for
her, but she considers instead working hard on her application and trying to get the
position on her own merits.
To what extent do you feel Jill should work hard on her application and try to get the position on
her own merits?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

11. Justin is a student artist and likes to paint graffiti in public areas, even though
the city’s policy prohibits it. He believes people like his work, and while waiting
alone in a subway station, Justin considers painting some colorful graffiti on a blank
wall in the station.
To what extent do you feel Justin should or should not paint some colorful graffiti on a blank wall
in the station?
feel very strongly
he should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

8

feel very strongly
he should
9

12. Brenda and Dan just finished an expensive dinner at a fine local restaurant. The
bill is accurate, but is far more expensive than they thought it would be. The waiter
was good. Brenda and Dan know they could just leave a small tip, but consider
spending more money to give the waiter an appropriate larger amount.
To what extent do you feel Brenda and Dan should or should not leave the waiter a good tip?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
they should not
neutral
they should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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13. Brian loves to gamble and particularly likes going to the racetrack. He’s been
on a losing streak and knows he should quit his habit, but he just got his paycheck
and considers going back to the track to gamble.
To what extent do you feel Brian should or should not go back to the track?
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

feel very strongly
he should
9

14. Chris needs one more math course to complete his college requirements. He is
taking a math course that is much too easy for him, because he has already been
taught all the material in another class. He considers taking a more difficult course
that would challenge him and teach him something new.
To what extent do you feel Chris should or should not take a more difficult math course?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

15. Melanie and Scott have just bought a house in a quiet, middle-class
neighborhood. The homes are not fancy, but are modest and well-kept. Melanie and
Scott are considering ignoring the community and painting their house bright
orange with green trim.
To what extent do you feel Melanie and Scott paint their house bright orange with green trim?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
they should not
neutral
they should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

16. While on campus, Jay is approached by a student asking if he could volunteer
two hours this weekend to help with a food drive for the local survival center. Jay
doesn’t have plans for the weekend. Jay is deciding whether to commit himself to
helping with the food drive.
To what extent do you feel Jay should or should not help with a food drive for the local survival
center?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

17. Sarah is getting more and more into debt with her credit card. She recently
bought lots of expensive new clothes and costly furniture for her apartment. She
could start saving her money but instead is thinking of buying a very expensive hidefinition TV and going into even deeper debt.
To what extent do you feel Sarah should or should not buy the TV and go into greater debt?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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18. Ellen moved to the city and is staying with a friend, who says she is welcome to
stay until she finds her own apartment. Ellen’s friend works long hours and is
rarely at home. Ellen could just put off finding her own place to live, but considers
looking for one as soon as she can.
To what extent do you feel Ellen should or should not start looking for her own apartment?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
she should not
neutral
she should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

19. Dana is cleaning out her closet and finds her old American flag. She has no need
for the flag anymore, so she is thinking of cutting it up into small pieces that she can
use as rags to clean her house.
To what extent do you feel Dana should or should not cut the American flag into pieces to be
used as rags?
feel very strongly
she should not
1
2

3

4

neutral
5

6

7

8

feel very strongly
she should
9

20. Ned inherited a lot of money and has cut back on work to manage his
investments. He is approached by a foundation that that has been successful at
setting up job-training for the poor and is in need of additional funding. Ned is
trying to decide whether to donate money for the foundation
To what extent do you feel Ned should or should not donate money to the foundation?
feel very strongly
feel very strongly
he should not
neutral
he should
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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APPENDIX C
PROJECTIVE AND PERSONAL TEMPTATION MEASURES

Regardless of actual behavior, to what extent do you think the typical student at UMass
would really want to engage in each of the following behaviors? In other words, how
tempted is the typical student to engage in each of following behaviors? Please circle the
number on the scale below from 1 (“Not at all tempted”) to 7 (“Extremely tempted”).
Cheat on an exam or paper
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Party during the week
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Be promiscuous
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Talk behind people’s backs
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Experiment with drugs
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Drink under age
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Have sex without protection
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted
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Procrastinate on schoolwork
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Smoke marijuana
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Destroy property
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Use Adderall to pull “all-nighters”
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Drive too fast or recklessly
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Steal from UMass
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Eat a lot of unhealthy foods
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Cheat on a boyfriend/girlfriend
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Skip class
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted
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Drive drunk
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Regardless of actual behavior, to what extent do you really want to engage in each of the
following behaviors? In other words, how tempted are you to engage in each of the
behaviors? Please circle the number on the scale below from 1 (“Not at all tempted”) to
7 (“Extremely tempted”).
Cheat on an exam or paper
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Party during the week
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Be promiscuous
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Talk behind people’s backs
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Experiment with drugs
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Drink under age
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Have sex without protection
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted
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Procrastinate on schoolwork
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Smoke marijuana
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Destroy property
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Use Adderall to pull “all-nighters”
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Drive too fast or recklessly
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Steal from UMass
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Eat a lot of unhealthy foods
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Cheat on a boyfriend/girlfriend
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Skip class
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Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted

Drive drunk
Not at all tempted :___1___:___
_
2___:___
_
3___:___
_
4___:___
_
5___:___
_
6___:___
_
7___:
_
Extremely
tempted
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APPENDIX D
TEST OF SELF-CONSCIOUS AFFECT-3R
Below are situations that people are likely encounter in day-to-day life, followed by
several common reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how
likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all
responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or
they may react different ways at different times.
For example:
You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside.
a. You would telephone a friend to catch up on news

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

b. You would take the extra time to read the paper

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

c. You would feel disappointed that it is raining

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

d. You would wonder why you woke up so early

very likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

In the above example, I’ve rated all of the answers by circling a number. I circled a “1”
for answer (a) because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday
morning—so it’s not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a “5” for answer (b)
because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I
circled a “3” for answer (c) because for me it’s about half and half. Sometimes I would
be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn’t—it would depend on what I had
planned. And I circled a “4” for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I had
awakened so early.
Please do not skip any items—rate all responses.

1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood your
friend up.
a. You would think: “I’m inconsiderate.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

b. You would think “Well, my friend will understand.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

c. You would think you should make it up to your
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very likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5

friend as soon as possible.

not likely

d. You would think: “My boss distracted me just
before lunch.

not likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
very likely

2. You break something at work and then hide it.
a. You would think: “This is making me anxious. I need
1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
to either fix it or get someone else to.”
not likely
very likely
b. You would think about quitting.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

c. You would think: “A lot of things aren’t made very
1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
well these days.”
not likely
very likely
d. You would think: “It was only an accident.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

3. You are out with friends one evening, and you’re feeling especially witty and
attractive. Your best friend’s partner seems to particularly enjoy your company.
a. You would think: “I should have been aware of what
1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
my best friend was feeling.”
not likely
very likely
b. You would feel happy with your appearance and
personality.

not likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5

c. You would feel pleased to have made such a good
impression.

not likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
very likely

d. You would think your best friend should pay attention 1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
to his/her partner.
not likely
very likely
e. Your would probably avoid eye contact for a
long time.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

4. In class, you wait until the last minute to plan a class project, and it turns out badly.
a. You would feel incompetent.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

b. You would think: “There are never enough hours in
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very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5

the day.”

not likely

c. You would feel: “I deserve to be reprimanded for
mismanaging the project.”
d. You would think: “What’s done is done.”

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

5. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error.
a. You would think the company did not like the
coworker.
b. You would think: “Life is not fair.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

c. You would keep quiet and avoid the coworker.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

d. You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the
situation.

very likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

6. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you
make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well.
a. You would think: “I guess I’m more persuasive than
1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
I thought.”
not likely
very likely
b. You would regret that you put it off

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

c. You would feel like a coward.

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

d. You would think: “I did a good job.”

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

e. You would think you shouldn’t have to make calls
1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
you feel pressured into.
not likely
very likely

7. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face.
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a. You would feel inadequate that you can’t even throw
1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
a ball.
not likely
very likely
b. You would think maybe your friend needs more
practice at catching.
c. You would think: “It was just an accident.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

d. You would apologize and make sure your friend
feels better.

very likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

8. You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very
helpful. A few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon as you
could.
a. You would feel immature.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

b. You would think: “I sure ran into some bad luck.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

c. You would return the favor as quickly as you could.

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

e. You would be proud that you repaid your debts.

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

d. You would think: “I am a trustworthy person.”

very likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

9. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.
a. You would think the animal shouldn’t have been on
1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
the road.
not likely
very likely
b. You would think: “I’m terrible.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

c. You would feel: “Well, it was an accident.”

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

d. You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert driving
1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
down the road.
not likely
very likely
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10. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you
did poorly.
a. You would think: “Well, it’s just a test.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

b. You would think: “The instructor doesn’t like me.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

c. You would think: “I should have studied harder.”

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

d. You would feel stupid.

very likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

11. You and a group of coworkers worked very hard on a project. Your boss singles
you out for a bonus because the project was such a success.
a. You would feel the boss is rather short-sighted.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

b. You would feel alone and apart from your
colleagues.
c. You would feel your hard work had paid off.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

e. You would feel you should not accept it.

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

d. You would feel confident and proud of yourself.

very likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

12. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there.
a. You would think: “It was all in fun; it’s harmless.”

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

b. You would feel small…like a rat.

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely
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very likely

c. You would think that perhaps that friend should
have been there to defend him/herself.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

d. You would apologize and talk about that person’s
good points.

not likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
very likely

13. You make a big mistake on an important class project in a class. Students were
depending on you, and your instructor criticizes you.
a. You would think your instructor should have been
1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
more clear about what was expected of you.
not likely
very likely
b. You would feel like you wanted to hide.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

c. You would think: “I should have recognized the
problem and done a better job.”
d. You would think: “Well, nobody’s perfect.”

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

14. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children. It
turns out to be frustrating and time-consuming work. You think seriously about
quitting, but then you see how happy the kids are.
a. You would feel selfish, and you’d think you are
basically lazy.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

b. You would feel you were forced into doing
something you did not want to do.

not likely

c. You would think: “I should be more concerned
about people who are less fortunate.”

not likely

d. You would feel great that you had helped others.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

e. You would feel very satisfied with yourself.

very likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

15. You are taking care of your friend’s dog while your friend in on vacation, and the
dog runs away.
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a. You would think: “I am irresponsible and
incompetent.”

not likely

b. You would think your friend must not take very
good care of the dog or it wouldn’t have run away

not likely

c. You would try to be more careful next time.

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

d. You would think your friend could just get a
new dog.

very likely

very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

16. You attend a family friend’s housewarming party and you spill red wine on a new
cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices.
a. You think your family friend should have
expected some accidents at such a big party.

not likely

b. You would stay late to help clean up the stain
after the party.

not likely

c. You would wish you were anywhere but at the
party.

not likely

d. You would wonder why your family friend chose
to serve red wine with the new light carpet.
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1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
very likely

1- - - 2 - - - 3 - - - 4 - - - 5
not likely

very likely

APPENDIX E
Proscriptive and Prescriptive Orientations Primes
We each have our own way of understanding right and wrong. We are interested in your
views. What comes to mind when you think about what it means to be immoral? More
specifically, what shouldn’t you do? When we don’t want to be immoral, we’re
basically considering ways we should not act and the kind of people we should not be.
In other words, we think about behaviors we should not engage in, types of people we
should not be, things we should not do. With these perspectives in mind, please
consider how to avoid being immoral by filling in the lines below. (Please use the
format below and fill in as many lines as you can.)

TO AVOID BEING IMMORAL:
I should not __________________________________________________________
I should not __________________________________________________________
I should not __________________________________________________________
I should not __________________________________________________________
I should not __________________________________________________________
I should not __________________________________________________________
I should not __________________________________________________________
I should not __________________________________________________________
I should not __________________________________________________________
I should not __________________________________________________________
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We each have our own way of understanding right and wrong. We are interested in your
views. What comes to mind when you think about what it means to be moral? More
specifically, what should you do? When we think about morality, we are basically
considering ways we should act and the kind of people we should be. In other words,
we think about behaviors we should engage in, types of people we should be, things we
should do. With these perspectives in mind, please consider how to be moral by filling
in the lines below. (Please use the format below and fill in as many lines as you can.)

TO BE MORAL:
I should _____________________________________________________________
I should _____________________________________________________________
I should _____________________________________________________________
I should _____________________________________________________________
I should _____________________________________________________________
I should _____________________________________________________________
I should _____________________________________________________________
I should _____________________________________________________________
I should _____________________________________________________________
I should _____________________________________________________________
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MENTAL SUPPRESSION STIMULI
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